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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals of the State of Utah has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(a) Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended (Addm. p. 1-2).

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case, as far as this appeal is concerned, is a civil
matter arising

from Robert D. Johnson1s Motion to Quash

Harris-Dudley Plumbing Company's Writ of Execution and for
declaratory relief in the wake of Harris-Dudley Plumbing
Company's attachment and attempted sale of the boat and boattrailer as the property of Irene B. Hook.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL
The issue on appeal is whether or not the Trial Court's
judgment denying Robert D. Johnson's (Appellant's) Motion to
Quash the Appellee's Writ of Execution should be reversed.
The ultimate issue before the Trial Court below was whether
the Writ of Execution, caused to be issued by Harris-Dudley
Plumbing Company, should be quashed pursuant to Robert D.
Johnson's Motion, the immediate issue being the ownership of
the subject boat and boat-trailer. The Trial Court determined
that the boat and boat-trailer both belong to Irene Hook and
accordingly denied Robert D. Johnson's Motion and ruled that
Harris-Dudley Plumbing Company was free to proceed with an
execution sale.

Robert D. Johnson, has appealed contending

that the boat and boat-trailer were his and that the Trial
Court committed error in determining that said boat and boattrailer belonged to Irene Hook and in denying his Motion to
Quash.
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DEFINITIONS, REFERENCES AND ABBREVIATIONS
Harris-Dudley Plumbing Company, a Utah corporation, Third
Party Plaintiff and Judgment Creditor and Appellee, will be
referred to as "Harris-Dudley."
Robert D. Johnson, Third Party Defendant and Judgment
Debtor and Appellant, will be referred to as "Johnson."
Irene Hook, Third Part Defendant and Judgment Debtor and
Appellant, will be referred to as "Hook."
Transcript and page references therein will be referred
to as (TR p.

) .

Transcript of the evidentiary hearing on June 14, 1988
and page references therein will be referred to as (EH 6/14/88
P-

) •
Transcript of the evidentiary hearing on August 5, 1988

and page references therein will be referred to as (EH 8/5/88
P-

) •
Transcript of the evidentiary hearing of September 19,

1989 and page references therein will be referred to as (EH
9/19/89 p.

) .

Transcript of the deposition of Robert D. Johnson on
April 8, 1988 and page references therein will be referred to
as (Johnson Depo 4/8/88 p.

) .
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Transcript of the deposition of Robert D. Johnson on
April 15, 1988 and page references therein will be referred to
as (Johnson Depo 4/15/88 p.

).

Transcript of the deposition of Robert D. Johnson on July
27, 1988 and page references therein will be referred to as
(Johnson Depo 7/27/88 p.

) .

Transcript of the deposition of Irene Hook on July 2 6,
1988 will be referred to as (Hook Depo 7/26/88 p.

) .

Transcript of the deposition of Irene Hook on August 31,
1988 will be referred to as (Hook Depo 8/31/88 p.

) .

Addendum pages will be referred to as (Addm. p.

) .

BOAT AND BOAT-TRAILER DESCRIPTIONS
So there will be no confusion, the following documentary
description, or similar description, in whole or in part,
identifies the subject boat:
HIN FBF 05221M79H, Status L, Type BB, Make FBF,
Style 10, Year 79, Length 24 02, Tran-D 071186,
Identification No- FBF 05221M79H24DS
See Exhibits 3, 12, 41, 43 and 45, and
Addm. p. 44, 52, 63, 65, and 67.
The

following

documentary

description,

or

similar

description, in whole or in part, identifies the subject boattrailer:
VIN 79184, Type LL, Make WLLC, Body Type BT,
Model 791, Year 79, Tran-D 070986, Tran-D 071989,
Cyl 0
See Exhibits 1, 8, 13, 42, 44 and 46, and
Addm. p. 43, 47, 64, 66, and 68.
- 4 -

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee Harris-Dudley feels that a more concise and
accurate statement of the nature of the case is appropriate.
After a plea of guilty to the charge of "Felony Theft"
(TR

p.

15-16),

the

Defendant

Hook,

at

an

appropriate

restitution hearing, was found to have unlawfully taken from
Harris-Dudley, her former employer, the sum of Three Hundred
and Ninety-Nine Thousand Dollars ($399,000.00) (TR p. 40-41),
whereupon a restitution order was accordingly entered (TR p.
37-38) whereby Harris-Dudley was granted judgment against Hook
in the amount of $399,000.00 and she was ordered to pay
Harris-Dudley

by

way

of

restitution

that

amount.

The

"Restitution Order," (Addm. p. 29-31) by virtue of the provisions of §77-18-1(6) U.C.A. 1953, as amended (Addm. p. 3-6),
is considered a civil judgment under which a victim may seek
civil remedy.

Harris-Dudley subsequently caused a Writ of

Execution to issue (TR p. 59-60), and attached as the property
of Hook

a certain

boat

and

boat-trailer

(TR p.

59-60)

whereupon Johnson, claiming the boat was his, moved to quash
the Writ of Execution and at the same time sought certain
declaratory relief (TR p. 67-68).
The protracted hearing below centered on the ownership of
the boat and boat-trailer.

The Trial Court found that Hook

had received title to the subject boat and boat-trailer from
- 5 -

Johnson on or about May 28, 1982, that she subsequently
registered the boat and boat-trailer with the Department of
Motor Vehicles of the State of Utah and, that at the time of
the last hearing session on September 19, 1989, was still the
owner of both the subject boat and boat-trailer.

The Trial

Court further found that she had never reconveyed the boat to
Johnson nor did she ever otherwise divest herself of the same
although there was a purported reconveyance of the boattrailer on or about April 27, 1987 (Addm. p. 43). The Court
also found, although such finding (in the light of the other
findings) was not necessary for Harris-Dudley to prevail, that
the purported reconveyance of the

boat-trailer was without

receiving a reasonable equivalent value in exchange for the
purported transfer, and was with an actual intent to hinder,
delay and defraud Harris-Dudley (see TR p. 310-311 and Addm.
p. 37-38).
The Court

accordingly

entered

judgment

in favor of

Harris-Dudley (TR p. 306-307 and Addm. p. 40-42), adjudging
that Hook was the owner of the subject boat and boat-trailer
and also ruled that any purported transfer of the ownership of
the boat and/or boat-trailer back to Johnson on or about April
27, 1987, would be a fraudulent conveyance within the meaning
of §75(sic)-l-7,8 [should be §25-1-7,8] U.C.A. 1953 (Addm. p.
7-10), as amended, which section and related sections have
since been repealed by Laws 1988 Chapter 59, §16 and replaced
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by §45(sic)-6-1 [should be §25-6-1] to 13 Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act (TR p. 306-313 and Addm. p. 12-24).
The Court accordingly denied Johnson's Motion to Quash
and adjudged that Harris-Dudley was free to proceed with the
execution sale of the subject boat and boat-trailer (TR p.
3 06-3 08) . It is from that judgment that the Appellant Johnson
has appealed (TR p. 325-326 and Addm. p. 40-42).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Johnson has shown no basis whatsoever to disturb any of
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Trial Court
and accordingly

the judgment of the Trial Court denying

Johnson's motion to quash should stand.
The Trial Court never found that there had been any
conveyance by Hook, fraudulent or otherwise, of the boat and
boat-trailer back to Johnson.

On the contrary, the Court

specifically found that there was never any conveyance of the
boat and only a purported conveyance of the boat-trailer back
to Johnson and went on to find and determine that any conveyance would have been a fraudulent conveyance (TR p. 325-326
and Addm. p. 40-41).
The Trial Court having found that hook owned the boat and
the boat-trailer, it was entirely proper that Johnson's Motion
to Quash the Harris-Dudley Writ of Execution be denied.
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Harris-Dudley should be awarded costs and attorney's fees
pursuant to Rules 3 3 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure (Addm. p. 25, 26-27).

ARGUMENT
Point I
JOHNSON HAS SHOWN NO BASIS WHATSOEVER TO
DISTURB ANY OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW OF THE TRIAL COURT AND
ACCORDINGLY THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT DENYING JOHNSON'S MOTION TO QUASH
SHOULD STAND.
Appellantfs
appellate brief.

brief

on appeal hardly

qualifies

as an

It is virtually a rehash of the Appellant's

argument to the Trial Court rather than pointing out any
specific error on the part of the Trial Court.
It should also be noted that this is not the time nor the
place, by implication or direct argument, to cast any doubt as
to the validity of the civil judgment of Harris-Dudley against
Hook arising out of the criminal proceeding.

This appeal

involves only the civil aspect of the proceedings below
centering on the ownership of the boat and boat-trailer.
The following is delineated to dispel any suggestion or
implication in Johnson's brief that there might have been some
irregularity with respect to the criminal matter involving
Hook and the resulting civil judgment against her:

- 8 -

At the very outset of the evidentiary hearing, it was
recognized that the parties to this civil proceeding were
Harris-Dudley, Johnson and Hook - all three of them (EH 8/5/88
p. 3-4).
The evidentiary hearing in the Court below was lengthy
and protracted, involving hearings on June 14, 1988, August 5,
1988, and September 19, 1989.
The deposition of Johnson required two sessions (see the
transcripts of 4/8/88 and 4/15/88).

The deposition of Hook

required two sessions (see the transcripts of 7/26-27/88 and
8/31/88).

She failed to appear August 3, 1988, (Hook Depo

8/3/88). Counsel for Johnson made no appearance whatsoever at
any of the deposition sessions of Johnson or Hook (note the
transcripts).
The transcripts of all of the depositions of Johnson and
Hook were, by stipulation, received in evidence (EH 8/5/88 p.
8).
The Court below found at an appropriate restitution
hearing that Hook, over a considerable period of time, had
unlawfully taken from Harris-Dudley the sum of $399,000.00 (TR
p. 40-41 and Addm. p. 36-37) and, accordingly, the Court made
and entered a Restitution Order (TR p. 37-39 and Addm. p. 2931) whereby Harris-Dudley was granted judgment against Hook in
the amount of $399,000.00 and she was ordered to pay to
Harris-Dudley by way of restitution that amount (TR p. 37-39
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and Addm. p. 29-31).

The Restitution Order by its express

terms and by virtue of the provisions of §77-18-1(6) U.C.A.
1953, as amended (Addm. p. 5), is a legal judgment enforceable
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Although Hook moved
for a rehearing and objected to the proposed Restitution Order
(TR p. 31-32), the Restitution Order (Addm. p. 29-31) was
nevertheless entered.

Hook subsequently filed an Affidavit

(TR p. 73-74 and Addm. p. 54-62) seeking to have the Court set
aside the Restitution Order which had been entered.

Hookfs

effort in that regard was resisted by the State (TR p. 80-81) .
Her motion to vacate the Restitution Order was denied (TR p.
96) .

She never appealed the Restitution Ord€»r.
Harris-Dudley eventually sought and obtained an Order in

Supplemental Proceedings (TR p. 77-78) which was resisted by
Hook (TR p. 109-110).

The Court thereupon entered an order

authorizing Harris-Dudley to continue to seek civil remedy
against Hook (TR p. 104-107).

As previously indicated, this

appeal involves only the civil aspect of the proceedings below
centering on the ownership of the boat and boat-trailer.
Accordingly, in the light of all that has transpired in
the case, statements by the Appellant in his brief, such as
the following, are ridiculous and in some instances, contrary
to the record and outright misleading:
Page 7
Johnson contends that the only
testimony Harris has placed on the issue
- 10 -

of the Motion to Quash is an affidavit
filed by Mr. John R. Dudley, President of
the
Company
Harris-Dudley
Plumbing
Company (TR p. 116-118).
His entire
affidavit is not shown to be based on any
legal, documentary or other evidence and
further states conclusions of law that
clearly
are not admissible.
The
affidavit is self serving and does
nothing to counter Johnson's legitimate
claim to the property.
Page 9
Johnson has established all the
viable evidence showing his ownership and
the legal and pragmatic rationale for all
transactions. There is no reliable substantial evidence to the contrary by the
opposing party, just innuendoes and
hearsay, and some fear.
... Johnson's unrebutted evidence alone
stands for a finding of no reasonable
basis whatsoever for the trial Court's
ruling in this matter.
was
not
the
and

Harris's evidence on the other hand
irrelevant, hearsay, remote and did
focus on the issue and although in
record most was stricken as remote
hearsay. ...

The following statement by Johnson, through his counsel
on page 6 of his brief, is absolutely untrue and is contrary
to documentary evidence (Exhibit 1 and Addm. p. 43) and the
express finding of the Court (TR p. 310 and Addm. p. 37):
The next transaction occurred April 27,
1987, when Ms. Hook transferred the boat
back to Johnson for release of a debt
owed to Johnson by Ms. Hook. (TR 64, 65
Exhibit A ) .
It is clear on its face that the purported conveyance of
April 27, 1987, by virtue of the signed-off title (Exhibit 1
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and Addm. p. 43), did not even relate to the boat but
purported to relate only to the boat-trailer.

Exhibit 1 on

its face relates to the boat-trailer only and not to the boat.
And the Trial Court so found (see Findings of Fact Nos. 3 and
6, TR p. 309-312, and Addm. p. 36-39).

Counsel for the

Appellant made the same futile, deceptive argument to the
Trial Court. The evidence was clear that Hook was in fact the
registered owner of both the boat and the boat-trailer right
up to the time of the last hearing on September 19, 1989, (see
Exhibits 5, 8, 12, 13, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and Addm. p. 4546, 47, 52, 53, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68).
As a matter of fact, counsel for Johnson is totally
inconsistent in his argument when he states on page 6 of the
Appellant's Brief:
The next transaction occurred April 27,
1987, when Ms. Hook transferred
the boat
back to Johnson ... (emphasis added)
and then on page 8 states:
... Johnson's documents showed a signed
off title to the trailer
... (emphasis
added)
Any purported transfer to Johnson of the boat-trailer was
evidenced only by the "signed off title" that referred solely
to the boat-trailer and not to the boat (Exhibit 1 and Addm.
p. 43) . The Trial Court was not misled and noted that the
purported "transfer back," evidenced by the signed off title,
involved only the boat-trailer and recognized that in spite of
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the "signed off title" purportedly given to Johnson, that
Hook, nevertheless, remained the registered title owner of
both the boat and the boat-trailer right up to the time of the
last hearing (see Exhibits as indicated above).
Johnson argues to this court, as he did at trial, that
there was a transfer of the boat in Wyoming (Appellant's Brief
p. 7; EH 9/19/89 p. 77-80).

But any claim of a transfer in

Wyoming is contrary to his earlier testimony, and even Hook's
testimony.

Johnson

claimed

early

in

the

Trial

Court

proceeding, both during the trial and in deposition, that the
boat was transferred to him on April 27, 1987, (and not in
Wyoming) by virtue of the "signed off title" (Exhibits 1 and
9 and Addm. p. 43, 49-51; EH 6/14/88 p. 47-59; Johnson Depo
4/8/88

p.

49-50,

53-54).

Hook

also

testified

in

her

deposition that there was a transfer of the boat on April 27,
1987, by virtue of the signed off title (Hook Depo 7/26/88 p.
50-51).

But as already pointed out (and was pointed out to

the Trial Court and as the Trial Court obviously believed) the
purported

transaction of April 27, 1987, involved only the

boat-trailer (Exhibit 1 and Addm. p. 43) and not the boat.
And when Johnson was confronted with that reality by way of
Harris-Dudley's

"Memorandum

in

Opposition

to

Johnson's Motion to Quash" and also at trial —

Robert

D.

that the

signed off title (Exhibit 1 and Addm. p. 43) referred to the
boat-trailer and not to the boat (TR p. 119-140; EH 6/14/88
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p. 41-48)

then counsel for Johnson prepared an Affidavit

for Hook to sign (Exhibit 15 and Addm. p. 54-62; Hook Depo p.
30-38) whereby

Hook then claimed that there had been a

transfer of title to the boat in Wyoming on or about May 6,
1987, (Exhibit 15 and Addm. p. 54-62) although Hook testified
in her deposition when questioned about the Affidavit that she
didn't even know what an affidavit was (Hook Depo 7/26/88 p.
42) and Johnson likewise shifted to his claim that there had
been some transfer of the boat to him in Wyoming (EH 9/19/89
p. 77-80) and his counsel has so argued (Appellant's Brief p.
7) .

The Trial Court was obviously ill impressed with the

Wyoming episode, particularly, no doubt, in light of the fact
that when Hook went with Johnson to Wyoming, she, by her own
admission, was in a "daze" and didn't even know what she was
doing (Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. 73-75).

Her whole testimony with

respect to her going to Wyoming and what happened there is
ludicrous (Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. 70-75).
Her involvement with Johnson in his registering the boat
in his name in Wyoming was certainly not convincing evidence
of any transfer.

It is much more consistent with a conniving

effort on the part of Hook and Johnson to simply let the boat
be registered in Wyoming in Johnson's name to conceal Hook's
ownership and keep Harris-Dudley from executing on it.
even if

And

it were evidence of any transfer, it certainly

wouldn't offset all of the contrary evidence which the Trial
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Court had before it showing that Hook was in fact the owner of
the boat right up to the time of the trial.
integrity

and

candor

were

obvious.

Her lack of

Johnson's

argument

centering on the Wyoming episode didn't impress the Trial
Court at all in the face of all the other evidence showing
Hook's ownership of both the boat and the boat-trailer.

All

an applicant had to do in the State of Wyoming to register a
boat was to fill out an application and represent that the
boat was his. That was the essence of Johnson's testimony (EH
6/14/88 p. 49; EH 8/5/88 p. 57-59).

The finding of Hook's

ownership of both the boat and boat-trailer is amply supported
by the evidence.

The Trial Court was totally justified in

disregarding Johnson's argument, but which he insists on
repeating to this Court.

Finding No. 3 is amply supported by

the evidence.
Furthermore, not only was the evidence, both oral (by
witnesses at the protracted hearing and also at the depositions) and documentary, very extensive, but, in addition,
memorandums were filed analyzing the evidence.

Reference is

specifically made to Harris-Dudley's "Memorandum in Opposition
to Robert D. Johnson1 s Motion to Quash" of May 19, 1988, (TR
p. 119-140) and to Harris Dudley's "Post-Trial Memorandum" of
October 2, 1989, (TR 264-279).

The Court's attention is

invited to both of those memorandums, which are a part of the
record as indicated, for a more elaborate discussion and
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analysis of the evidence which fully support the Trial Court's
findings. There would seem to be no need of repeating in this
brief what is set forth very clearly in those memorandums.
The Court's attention is invited to the Findings of Fact
Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 6 (Addm. p. 37-38) made and entered by the
Trial Court (TR 309-312):
It is undisputed that Hook acquired both the boat and
boat-trailer on or about May 28, 1982, as noted by the Court
in Finding No. 1 (TR p. 310 and Addm. 37). Finding No. 1 is
amply supported by the Bill of Sale (Exhibit 3 and Addm. p.
44) and the testimony of both Johnson (EH 6/14/88 p. 12;
Johnson Depo 4/15/88 p. 4-5) and the testimony of Hook (Hook
Depo 7/26/88 p. 47-49).
Finding No. 2 is amply supported by the Certificate of
Registration (see Exhibits 5, 12, 13, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46
and Addm. p. 45-46, 52, 53, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68) and the
testimony of Hook (Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. 45) , as well as the
testimony of Johnson (Johnson Depo 4/15/88 p. 12) .
There is no documentary evidence whatsoever contrary to
Finding No. 3, and both Finding Nos. 3 and 6 are fully
supported by the evidence.

As indicated above, on April 27,

1987, Irene B. Hook purported to sign off on a Certificate of
Title (Exhibit 1 and Addm. p. 43) and it is by virtue of that
document that Johnson at trial claimed to have received the
boat (Johnson Depo 4/8/88 p. 47-48).
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The fact of the matter

is, as aireaay indicated, the Certificate of Title doesn't
even refer to the boat (Exhibit 1 and Addm. p. 43) , but
relates only to the boat-trailer.

Moreover, as noted above,

Hook continued to remain the registered owner of not only the
boat but also the boat-trailer right up to the time of the
last hearing on September 19, 1989, (Exhibits 5, 12, 13, 41,
42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and Addm. p. 45-46, 52, 53, 63, 64, 65, 66,
67, 68) . Furthermore, she continued to exercise ownership and
dominion over both the boat and boat-trailer and to use them
(Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. 51-53; Johnson Depo 4/15/88 p. 9-10).
She carried insurance on the boat and boat-trailer to May 3,
1988, (Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. 103-104; EH 9/19/89 p. 18-19).
Hook took care of the licensing and registration (Hook Depo
7/26/88 p. 65-70) . She kept the boat at Flaming Gorge in her
garage at Manila (EH 8/5/88 p. 9-10; Johnson Depo 4/8/88 p.
44-45; EH 6/14/88 p. 63; Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. 105).

Going

back to April 27, 1982, Johnson couldn't even remember having
driven the boat (EH 8/5/88 p. 34). Hook really arranged for
the transfer of the boat back to Salt Lake City in a round
about way (Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. 107) . And then Hook tried to
sell the boat.

There is no dispute about that.

Johnson at

the Evidentiary Hearing on June 14, 1988, testified that Hook
was trying to sell the boat, but was selling it for him as his
agent (EH 6/14/88 p. 56-57).

But later, on deposition and at

a succeeding session in Court, Johnson contradicted himself
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and testified that he wasn't trying to sell the boat (Johnson
Depo 7/27/88 p. 44-45; EH 8/5/88 p. 56) and that he had not
delegated anyone to sell it for him (Johnson Depo 7/27/88 p.
45; EH 8/5/88 p. 56). But Hook testified that she was trying
to sell the boat, but that it was for Johnson (Hook Depo
7/26/88 p. 107-108).

The conflicting testimony is glaring.

Certainly, there is no doubt about the fact that Hook was
trying to sell the boat. James Craft, an acquaintance of Hook
(EH 9/19/89 p. 27-28) , testified that Hook was trying to sell
the 24 f fiberfoam boat to him for $10,000.00 and even took him
out to see it (EH 9/19/89 p. 40-45) . All of the foregoing was
obviously much more persuasive to the Trial Court than a
purported signed-off title to the boat-trailer that obviously
neither Hook nor Johnson paid attention to.
With the depositions of Hook and Johnson having been made
part of the record, and with the lengthy hearing involving
three separate sessions, there is a mass of evidence, much of
which is conflicting, showing deceitful conduct on the part of
both Hook and Johnson to keep Harris-Dudley from executing on
the boat.

As pointed out in our Post-Trial Memorandum (TR

264-279), dealing with Johnson and Hook with respect to the
boat is like the proverbial shell game:

"Guess where the pea

[boat] is?" (TR 273) . From what is cited above, it is clear
that there is ample evidence

supporting the findings with

respect to Hook's ownership of both the boat and the boat-
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trailer.

The Court was entirely proper in denying Johnson's

Motion to Quash the execution caused to be issued by HarrisDudley.
The Appellate Court is, of course, required to view the
evidence, and any inferences drawn therefrom, and all of the
circumstances shown thereby, as well as the findings and
judgment of the Trial Court, with a presumption of validity
and correctness.

In so doing the Court will not disturb the

findings and judgment if they find substantial support in the
evidence viewed in a light most favorable to Harris-Dudley.
See Rodgers
Earle,

v. Hansen,

580 P.2d 233 (Utah 1978) ; O&erhansly v.

572 P.2d 1384 (Utah 1977); Carnesecca

572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977); Hanover Ltd.
(Utah 1977); Robertson
1977); Cornia
Bowen,

v.

Cornia,

v.

v.

v. Fields,

Hutchison,

Carnesecca,

568 P.2d 751

560 P.2d

1110 (Utah

546 P.2d 890 (Utah 1976); Cutler

543 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1975); Kesler

v. Rogers,

v.

542 P.2d

354 (Utah 1975). Where evidence is in conflict, the Appellate
Court assumes that the Trial Court believed those aspects of
evidence that support its findings.
Reeve,

See Fillmore

City

v.

571 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1977).
With Hook continuing as the registered owner of both the

boat

and

the

boat-trailer,

Harris-Dudley

was

entirely

justified in executing on the same.
Further, counsel's statement on page 15 of his brief is
another example of a misleading and deceptive statement:

- 19 -

He disallowed the testimony of Mr. James
Craft and Marcia Eldridge as hearsay.
As a matter of fact, the testimony was not disallowed.
Counsel for Johnson cited nothing in the record for such a
statement, nor could he.

Counsel's motion to strike the

testimony was taken under advisement (EH 9/19/89 p. 72), with
no ruling having ever been made.

Counsel for Johnson never

thereafter pressed the Court for any ruling.
Counsel for Harris-Dudley had urged that the testimony of
James Craft was not heresay, that we were essentially dealing
with a "verbal act," which was relied upon by James Craft. He
not only testified that Hook tried to sell him her boat, but
she took him out to see it.

We were not only dealing with

what Hook said to James Craft, but, in addition, his testimony
as to what he and Hook did pursuant to the effort to sell go out together and look at the boat. It was clear that while
the statement of Hook might not, by itself, prove that she
owned the boat, the testimony of James Craft did prove that
she said what she said and they did what they did.

The Trial

Court was entirely justified in considering this as further
evidence of Hook's ownership of the boat, although there was
ample evidence of that ownership even without the testimony of
James Craft.

In any event, the testimony was not stricken.

- 20 -

Point II
THE TRIAL COURT NEVER FOUND THAT THERE
HAD BEEN ANY CONVEYANCE BY HOOK, FRAUDULENT OR OTHERWISE, OF THE BOAT AND BOATTRAILER BACK TO JOHNSON.
ON THE
CONTRARY, THE COURT SPECIFICALLY FOUND
THAT THERE WAS NEVER ANY CONVEYANCE OF
THE BOAT AND ONLY A PURPORTED CONVEYANCE
OF THE BOAT-TRAILER BACK TO JOHNSON AND
WENT ON TO FIND AND DETERMINE THAT ANY
CONVEYANCE WOULD HAVE BEEN A FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCE.
The Trial Court never found that there had been any
conveyance by Hook, fraudulent or otherwise, of the boat and
boat-trailer back to Johnson. The central issue at the trial
of the case was Hook's ownership of the boat and boat-trailer
as opposed to Johnson's claim of ownership.
question

was

not

whether

there

had

been

The primary
a

fraudulent

conveyance, but whether there had been any conveyance at all.
Contrary to Johnson's argument, the Court specifically found
that there never was any conveyance of the boat and only a
purported

conveyance of the boat-trailer back to Johnson and

then went on to find and determine that any conveyance would
have been a fraudulent conveyance.

The Court's attention is

invited to Findings of Fact 1, 2, 3 and 6 and to the Conclusions of Law Nos. 1 and 2 (TR p. 309-311 and Addm. p. 36-39) .
Johnson's Argument No. 2 assumes the conveyance of the
boat and boat-trailer to him and argues that such was not a
"fraudulent conveyance."

But, as already pointed out, the

Court specifically found that there was never any conveyance
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whatsoever of the boat by Hook back to Johnson.

And, as

noted, there was ample evidence to support such a finding.
The issue of whether or not there was a "fraudulent
conveyance" could only apply to the boat-trailer since the
purported

conveyance of April 24, 1987, involv€>d a "signed off

title" (Addm. p. 43) identifying only the boat-trailer and not
the boat.

And with respect to any conveyance of the boat-

trailer, the Court found that there was only a

purported

conveyance of the boat-trailer on April 27, 1987, as evidenced
by the signed off title (Addm. p. 43) .

But, as already

pointed out under Point I above, there was uncontroverted
evidence

of

Hook's

continued

ownership,

including

her

continuing to be the registered owner way beyond April 27,
1987, right up until the time of the last hearing

(see

Exhibits 5, 12, 13, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and Addm. p. 45-46,
52, 53, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68). Accordingly, the Trial Court
was entirely justified in disregarding the purported

convey-

ance of the boat-trailer in light of the weighty evidence of
Hook's continued ownership.
However, in light of the realities of the case and the
evidence before it, the Court went on to find that any conveyance of the boat or boat-trailer would have been a fraudulent
conveyance.

Such was not necessary in view of the fact that

the Court specifically found that there was no reconveyance of
either the boat or the boat-trailer.
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There was, in reality,

no need

for the Court to consider whether there was a

fraudulent conveyance of the boat and boat-trailer back to
Johnson.

Nevertheless, the Court, being quite aware of all

the evidence which was before it, did rule, in effect, that
even if there had been a conveyance or purported
either

the

purported
been

boat or boat-trailer

conveyance of

(but there was

only a

conveyance of the boat-trailer), such would have

fraudulent

within

the

meaning

of

the

fraudulent

conveyance statute.
With respect to the matter of a "fraudulent conveyance"
of the boat-trailer —

if there had been a conveyance —

the

following is noted:
December 23, 1986:

*A civil action was initiated
Summons and Complaint.

-

January 12, 1987:

*An Amended Complaint was filed and
in the hands of her attorney asserting the claim of in excess of
$300,000.00 for various causes of
action including fraud.

*The Trial Court and Hook were, of course, well aware of
the civil action that had been initiated by Harris-Dudley
against Hook and the Amended Complaint that was filed
against her asserting the claim of in excess of
$3 00,000.00 for various causes of action, including
fraud, as was referred to in Harris-Dudleyfs "Post-Trial
Memorandum" (TR p. 278).
January
, 1987: Information was filed (TR p. 14)
(Day of the month is not discernable)
March 9, 1987:

Hook pleaded guilty to the charge as
set forth in the information (TR p.
15-16).

March 9, 1987:

The arraignment and plea of guilty
(TR p. 17) .
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April 6, 1987:

Hook was sentenced (TR p. 18).

April 27, 1987:

Date that Hook purported to sign off
on the title to the boat-trailer
(Exhibit 1 and Addm. p. 43).

Furthermore, there was evidence of the pcist intimate and
long standing relationship between Johnson and Hook (Hook Depo
8/31/88 p. 38; EH 6/14/88 p. 21-33; EH 8/5/88 p. 89-116; EH
9/19/89 p. 7 ) . The Court, no doubt, believed that Hook never
really owed Johnson anything whatsoever (EH 6/14/88 p. 68, 70;
Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. 38-40).

There was never any note or

writing of any kind (EH 6/14/88 p. 68; Hook Depo 7/26/88 p.
39) with respect to any money Johnson claimed he gave to Hook;
it was simply to help her out (EH 6/14/88 p. 70; Johnson Depo
4/8/88 p. 31). Accordingly, even if any money whatsoever had
been given to Hook, the Court, no doubt, believed that it was
by way of a gift rather than a loan.

And anyway it was more

than, eight years prior to Hook's deposition on July 26, 1988,
that any money had passed between her and Johnson (Hook Depo
7/26/88 p. 16). Marsha Eldridge testified that Hook stated in
her presence that she, Hook, had given Johnson a substantial
sum of money which she believed was $10,000.00, in connection
with an IRS audit of Johnson (EH 9/19/89 p. 53).

And on

another occasion Hook had stated in her presence, "I don't owe
him a damned dime, not anything." (EH 9-19-89 p. 46-52).

And

earlier when Hook was asked on her deposition whether on at
least three occasions she didn't, in essence, state, "I don't
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owe him a damned thing," she replied, "I don't know," and, "I
couldn't say one way or the other," (Hook Depo 7/26/88 p. 39,
41) .

In view of all that evidence, the Court was entirely

justified in finding that the "purported reconveyance of the
boat-trailer"

even if it had been intended to be a

conveyance — was, in fact, a "fraudulent conveyance" without
receiving a reasonable equivalent value in exchange for the
purported transfer and was with an actual intent to hinder,
delay and defraud Harris-Dudley.
But as indicated above, the evidence was overwhelming
that Hook was the continuous owner of both the boat and the
boat-trailer right up to the time of the last hearing on
September 19, 1989.
Point III
THE TRIAL COURT HAVING FOUND THAT HOOK
OWNED THE BOAT AND THE BOAT-TRAILER, IT
WAS ENTIRELY PROPER THAT JOHNSON1S MOTION
TO QUASH THE HARRIS-DUDLEY WRIT OP
EXECUTION BE DENIED.
It is obvious that it was entirely proper for the Trial
Court, having found that Hook owned the boat and the boattrailer, to deny Johnson's Motion to Quash the Harris-Dudley
Writ of Execution and order that Harris-Dudley be free to
proceed with the execution sale.

Reference

is made to

Findings of Fact Nos. 1 and 2 (TR p. 310 and Addm. p. 37),
Conclusion of Law No. 1 (TR p. 311 and Addm. p. 37) and the
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Judgment and Order of the Trial Court (TR 306-307 and Addm. p.
40-42).
Point IV
HARRIS-DUDLEY SHOULD BE AWARDED COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO RULES 33 AND
34 OP THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
Harris-Dudley should be awarded costs and attorney's fees
pursuant to Rules 3 3 and 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, copies of said rules being set forth

in the

Addendum to this brief at pages 25, 26-27• Appellant's appeal
is "frivolous" and has caused needless delay and expense. The
appeal is not grounded in fact, nor warranted by existing law
and is not based on a good faith argument.

Specifically, the

Court's attention is invited to the following:
1.

The Appellant's (Johnson's) brief is nothing more

than a rehash of the argument made in the Trial Court.

That

argument was rejected and this is no place for it to be
repeated.

The brief

fails to rise to the level of an

Appellate argument.
2.

Johnson's brief is replete with misleading, incon-

sistent and deceptive statements, such as the following:
P. 1, f 3 - There is nothing in the record whatsoever to
show

that

both

possession."

the boat

and

boat-trailer

were

"in his

As a matter of fact, they were not "in his

possession." Hook arranged, in a round about way, to have her
son bring the boat and boat-trailer to Salt Lake City for the
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purpose of sale. The boat and boat-trailer were brought back
from Hook's place at Flaming Gorge and was stored on her son's
property for quite a while and then:
We moved it off his driveway to the
property of a friend of my second son.
When the Constable went out to get it, it
was on
friend.

Ron Burnside's property, the
(Hook Depo 8/31/88 p. 58-59)

P. 1, 1 3 - The boat and boat-trailer were executed on as
the property of Hook, and Harris-Dudley did in fact have a
civil judgment resulting from a restitution order. The words
"alleged" and "believed" while not critical, are not correct
and they are misleading.
P. 1, f 4 - The central issue at the evidentiary hearing
was

the

ownership

of

the

boat

and

boat-trailer.

The

indication of a "subsequent issue of the legal ownership of
the boat and trailer" is deceptive and suggests that ownership
was an incidental matter. Ownership was not some "subsequent"
issue.

It was the issue.

P. 2, f 1 - The following unclear statement with respect
to the findings is deceptive:
That Irene Hook is the owner
and trailer, there was a
conveyance of the property to
Johnson's Motion to Quash is

of the boat
fraudulent
Johnson and
denied.

Reference is made to the Findings themselves (TR p. 3 06312 and Addm. p. 3 6-39) . The statement suggests that Hook was
found to be the owner because of a fraudulent conveyance with
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the implication that her ownership would fail if there were
not a fraudulent conveyance. The Court did not find that Hook
remained the owner of both the boat and boat-trailer because
there was a fraudulent conveyance.
themselves

(Addm. p. 3 6-39).

The Findings speak for

The Court found that Hook was

in fact the owner of the boat and boat-trailer right up to the
time of the hearing based on a mass of evidence.

The Court

also found that there never was any conveyance, fraudulent or
otherwise, of either the boat or boat-trailer

only a

purported conveyance of the boat-trailer (Addm. p. 43). The
Court went on to also find that any conveyance of the boat or
boat-trailer would have been a fraudulent conveyance (Addm. p.
3 6-39) .

The latter finding was not essential to either the

Conclusions of Law or the judgment. Counsel's statement that
the Court believed that the ownership resulted from a conveyance that failed because it was a "fraudulent conveyance" is
not in accordance with the Findings

(Addm. p. 3 6-3 9) .

Reference is made to Points I and II of this brief.
P. 2, 1[ 4 -

Paragraph 2 of the STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON

APPEAL not only misconceives the findings, but again would
tend to mislead the court:
Whether or not there was sufficient
evidence to warrant the Court's Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law that there
was any fraudulent conveyance of the boat
and trailer.
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If Hook was the owner of the boat and boat-trailer and if
she never conveyed or divested herself of either of them, then
whether

or

not

essentially moot.

there

was

a

fraudulent

conveyance

The finding that if there had been a

conveyance it would have been fraudulent is unnecessary.
Court was

is

essentially

noting

that

if there had

The

been a

conveyance, it would have been a fraudulent one. Furthermore,
such could only apply to the purported conveyance of the boattrailer as has already been pointed out.
The determination of ownership of the boat and boattrailer did not at all depend upon any Finding of Fact or
Conclusions of Law with respect to a "fraudulent conveyance."
As already indicated, the Court specifically found that Hook
was the owner of the boat and boat-trailer and that there had
never

been

any

reconveyance

of

either.

The

purported

conveyance of the boat-trailer is so inconsistent with Hook's
continued ownership of the same as well as the boat that the
Court obviously paid no attention to the purported conveyance.
The Court simply went on to find that any conveyance of the
boat or boat-trailer would have been a fraudulent conveyance.
But such a finding was not essential to the decision.
P. 3, 5 2 - The statement that:
A non-evidentiary hearing was held before
Judge Uno on the 21st day of September,
1987.
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is totally untrue.

The statement is apparently made to

suggest to the Court that the Restitution Order stems from
something "non-evidentiary" — even casual. The fact is there
was an evidentiary hearing of some magnitude resulting in the
Court's finding of indebtedness and the Order of Restitution
(Addm. p. 29-31).
P. 4, f 2 - There was no "second determination of
restitution."

There was a restitution hearing (Addm. p. 28)

resulting in the finding of Hook's indebtedness and the Order
and Judgment that followed (Addm. p. 40-42).
P. 4, 5 2 - The statement that:
Harris, on March 17, 1988, started civil
proceedings against Ms. Hook to collect
the money by a motion in Supplementary
Proceedings.
may not be critical, but again is an outright misstatement.
By statute, Harris-Dudley had a civil judgment and in an
effort to recover on that judgment, did obtain an Order in
Supplemental Proceedings.
P. 4, 5 2 - There is no basis for any such statement as,
"This was the only civil pleading in the whole case."

This

statement, again, seems to have been made to suggest something
irregular. Harris-Dudley had a judgment and was proceeding in
an orderly and proper manner to recover on the judgment. The
Order in Supplemental Proceeding was entirely appropriate as
was the Writ of Execution.
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jf. 4, f 4 - The first issue considered at the evidentiary
hearing was not "whether or not Johnson owned the boat and
trailer," but whether Hook owned the boat and boat-trailer.
The boat and boat-trailer were executed upon as the property
of Hook and the Court found that indeed both boat and boattrailer were hers.

Johnson intervened by filing a Motion to

Quash the writ of execution. It was Harris-Dudley's position
that Hook was the owner of both the boat and boat-trailer and
that there had never been any conveyance of either one of them
to Johnson.

The Court so found.

It was further argued that

if there had been such a conveyance (which there was not) it
would have been a fraudulent conveyance and the Court so
found.
E|. 5, f 1 - The following statement is totally false:
That on or about April 27, 1987 she
transferred the boat and trailer back to
him.
The Court found that there was never any conveyance of either
the boat or boat-trailer of April 27, 1987, and that the
signed-off title to the boat-trailer was only a "purported
conveyance" in view of all the mass of evidence indicating
Hook's continued ownership, dominion and control of both the
boat and boat-trailer (see Point I).
PL 5, f 2 - There was never any ruling that there was a
fraudulent transfer

of the boat to Johnson.
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The Court

specifically

found

that

there was

never

any

conveyance

whatsoever of the boat.
P. 6, 5 3 - The following statement is false:
The next transaction occurred April 27,
1987, when Ms. Hook transferred the boat
back to Johnson ...
The evidence is clear and the Court so found that there
was never any conveyance of the boat on April 27, 1987, but
only a purported conveyance of the boat-trailer (Addm. p. 43) .
It is also noted that this statement is inconsistent with the
above quoted statement in 1 1 on P. 5.
P. 7, J 1 - The statement in the first paragraph on page
7 referring to the Wyoming episode is not a correct statement
of what happened in Wyoming and is a rehash of the argument
made to the Trial Court which was totally rejected.

As

already pointed out, there is nothing in the evidence at all
compelling any finding of any conveyance of the boat in
Wyoming.
P. 7, 5 2 - The statement:
Johnson contends that the only testimony
Harris has placed on the issue of the
Motion to Quash is an affidavit filed by
Mr. John R. Dudley ...
is a gross misstatement of what transpired in the threesession evidentiary hearing.

The statement "that the only

testimony" was "an affidavit" is ridiculous.

Reference is

made to the transcripts of the three-hearing sessions.
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P. 7, 1 3 - Testimony elicited from Johnson with respect
to his relationship with Hook is neither remote nor irrelevant.

It had to do with the reality of a fraudulent convey-

ance if there had in fact been any conveyance.
P«

7 9 K 4 - There is no basis whatsoever

for any

statement like:
The evidence presented by Harris was not
competent to establish ownership of the
boat.
This is nothing but a wild, irresponsible statement.
Court's

attention

is

invited

to the delineation

The
of the

evidence already set forth in this brief.
P.

7-8,

5

4-1

-

The

statement

with

respect

to

"documentary evidence" and "registration" is not keyed to any
of the transcripts and is an irresponsible statement. Reference is made to what has already been set forth in this brief.
P. 8, 5 1 - The Statement that:
Harris did not present any evidence on
the Motion to Quash.
would cause the Court to wonder where Johnson and his counsel
were during the three session evidentiary hearing. Statements
that:
*. 8, J 3
In Johnson's case evidence clearly and
convincingly shows not only a valid claim
on his part but legal ownership.
and that:
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P. 8, 5 3
Irene Hook did not own the boat upon
which the execution was issued.
are just so much talk, are not referenced to anything in the
record, and nothing more than a wild and superficial argument
— and perhaps wishful thinking.
Counsel's statement that:
P. 8, J 3
The sole and only purpose of the hearing
before Judge Uno was to determine whether
or not the Motion to Quash a Writ of
Execution on property owned by Johnson
should have been granted.
begs the question of ownership and seems to suggest that
perhaps the Trial Court should have ruled on Johnson's motion
before

the

determined.

ownership

of the boat and

boat-trailer

The statement Ls nonsense and frivolous.

Statements that:
P- 9, H 2
Johnson has established all the viable
evidence showing his ownership and the
legal and pragmatic rationale for all
transactions.
and
P. 9, 1 2
There is no reliable substantial evidence
to the contrary of the opposing party,
just innuendos and hearsay, and some
fear,
and
P. 9, 5 3
Harris's evidence on the other hand was
irrelevant, hearsay, remote and did not
focus on the issue and although in the
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were

record most was stricken as remote and
hearsay,
are frivolous, irresponsible, untrue and deceptive.
There is no basis nor indeed anything even cited as a
basis for the statement that:
P. 9, ! 2
Johnson's rebutted evidence alone stands
for a finding of no reasonable basis
whatsoever for the Trial Court's ruling
in this matter.
P 10, J 4 - Without any analysis of the record and in the
face of all the evidence that was presented, the following
statement is again irresponsible:
The findings in this case should be
disturbed as they are not based on
substantial, competent and admissible
evidence.
The following is another wild frivolous statement which is
totally unjustified in the face of the record that is before
the Court.
J. 11, J 2 - In view of all the evidence that has been
delineated and is in the record, the following statement has
no basis whatsoever; indeed no basis is even cited:
Harris failed in sustaining his evidentiary burden of proof of clear and
convincing evidence.
The record on
appeal clearly preponderates against him
and the Trial Court's findings should be
reversed.
The following is again a totally untrue statement which would
indicate that counsel is ignoring the mass of evidence adduced
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in a three-session evidentiary hearing and in the multisession depositions of Hook and Johnson:
P. 11, 1 3
In the case before the Court there is
absolutely no evidence to support the
Court's findings.
P. 11, 5 4 - The suggestion that the issue of fraudulent
conveyance was not properly before the District Court has no
basis whatsoever.
P. 12, 5 1 - The statement at the top of page 12 that
"there is no evidence to support the Court's findings" is
false and misleading and can only be intended to be deceptive.
It is a gross misstatement.
P. 12, 5 1 - The statement that "Harris has no evidence
to justify any of his claim" seems to sugest that counsel must
have been asleep during a three-session evidentiary hearing.
He obviously wasn't very aware of what happened

in the

depositions as he wasn't even present at any of the sessions
of Hook's or Johnson's depositions.

Note the deposition

transcripts for appearances.
P. 12, 5 2 - The contention of Johnson
that nowhere in the volumes of
pleadings and testimony has Harris
introduced any reliable relevant evidence
to portray any intent of Ms. Hook or
Johnson to perpetrate any fraud.
seems to ignore the whole record.
preceding pages of this brief.
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Reference is made to the

Counsel for Johnson states:
if. 10, f 2
Johnson contends this Court should
completely disregard the testimony of
James Crafts and Marcia A. Eldridge.
Counsel for Johnson again states that the Court:
?• 15, 1 2
... disallowed the testimony of Mr. James
Craft and Marcia Eldridge as hearsay.
The first statement on page 10 is not justified and the
statement on page 15 is a misstatement of what happened.
Counsel moved to have the testimony of James Craft and Marcia
Eldridge stricken, but the Motion was taken under advisement
(EG 9/19/89 p. 72) and counsel for Johnson never pressed for
any ruling and none was ever made.

The testimony was not

stricken and thus stands.
Findings of Fact made and entered by the Trial Court
support the Conclusions of Law and the Judgment (Addm. p. 3 642) . The only legitimate issues on appeal would be whether or
not there is sufficient evidence to support the findings. The
Appellant (Johnson) has made no real analysis of the evidence
nor any meritorious challenge to any of the findings.

The

Appellant (Johnson) has simply argued on appeal what he did in
the Trial Court.
4^

Johnson's

argument

centering

on

no

fraudulent

conveyance could only apply to the boat-trailer and not to the
boat. Again, Johnson has argued as he did in the Trial Court.
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The finding with respect to the fraudulent conveyance was not
essential to support the Judgment.

The only real issue on

appeal could be whether or not there was ample evidence to
support the Findings in view of the fact that the Court
specifically found that Hook was the owner of both the boat
and the boat-trailer right up to the time of the last hearing
session on September 19, 1989 (Addm. p. 64, 65); that there
was just a purported reconveyance of the boat-trailer; but
that any purported

reconveyance

of the boat-trailer was

without receiving a reasonable equivalent value in exchange
for the purported transfer and was with an actual intent to
hinder, delay, and defraud Harris-Dudley.
really challenged

those Findings.

Johnson has not

Reference

is made to

Findings of Fact Nos. 2, 3, and 6 (TR p. 310-311 and Addm. p.
36-39).
The Findings were, as noted above, amply supported by the
evidence and fully support the Conclusions of Law and the
judgment. There is no specific challenge made to the Findings
and no challenge would have been justified.
5.

As already pointed out, the depositions of both Hook

and Johnson were received in evidence by stipulation (EH
8/5/88 p. 8) .

Counsel for Johnson did not appear at any of

the deposition sessions of Johnson and neither Johnson nor his
counsel

made

deposition

any

appearance

whatsoever

sessions of Hook.

Reference
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at

any

of

the

is made to the

transcripts of those depositions. Counsel for Johnson was not
familiar with that testimony only as he may have read the
depositions —

the Appellant's (Johnson's) brief evidences

little awareness on the part of Appellant's counsel of the
testimony

given

at

those

depositions.

Misleading

and

unfounded statements of the Appellant (Johnson) in his brief
have necessitated a tedious review of the transcripts of the
hearing sessions as well as the depositions in order to cite
evidence supporting the Findings.

The position of Harris-

Dudley is something like being hit with buckshot at a distance
— there is nothing at all fatal but needless time and delay
have been encountered in picking it out.
6.

With respect to the testimony of James Craft and

Marcia Eldridge, Johnson contends that the Court disallowed
the

testimony

and

refers to the evidentiary

hearing

of

September 19, 1989, on page 80-83 of the transcript (see p. 15
of Appellant's Brief).
with

testimony

of

The pages cited have nothing to do

James

Craft

and

Marcia

Eldridge

and

furthermore, the Court did not disallow the testimony, but
took Johnson's Motion to Strike under advisement (EH 9/19/89
p. 72) and was never pressed by Johnson for any ruling.

The

testimony remains.
7.
and

The Appellant's (Johnson's) argument is so frivolous

superficial

as to justify an award to the Appellee

(Harris-Dudley) for costs and attorney's fees.
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CONCLUSION
The findings of the Trial Court, with respect to the
ownership of the boat and boat-trailer in Hook, are supported
by substantial evidence in the record and accordingly it was
proper for the Trial Court to deny Johnson's Motion to Quash
and rule that Harris-Dudley was free to proceed with the
execution sale of the boat and boat-trailer.

The judgment of

the Trial Court should be affirmed with Harris-Dudley being
awarded its costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Rules 3 3 and
34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (Addm. p. 25, 2 627).

//
Respectfully submitted this ^

~~ day of November, 1990.

MCMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE &
PARKINSON, P.C.

Macoy A. McMurray
Attorneys for Appellee
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction [Effective until January i, lyoaj.

(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraorrii™™
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and to issue all wnts and process necessary to carry into efffcfits u d S n ^ t
orders, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction
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Effective January 1,

(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extranrAi~
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and to issue all writs and process necessary to car^ into e S S f
*
orders, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction
its judgments,
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction irmi,,^,, • • •.• .
interlocutory appeals, over:
ejunsoiction, including jurisdiction of
(a) the final orders and decrees of state and local aa0nnir><,
or
from the district court review of them, exceptThePuhfZT
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sion. State Tax Commission, Board a s S S h ^ ^ d S m
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(b) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(c) appeals from the circuit courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record i n n««- i
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(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs i„vni™
cnminal conviction, except those involving a
first
de£eTci»Z£Zy;
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(g) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support and visitation, adoption, and paternity; and
(h) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals, upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court, may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter
46b, Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304.
Amended effective January 1, 1988. —
Laws 1987, ch. 161, § 304 amends this section

effective January 1, 1988. See catchhne
"Amendment Notes," below
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective January 1, 1988, added Subsection (4).

78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court.
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of Appeals shall
be by petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-4, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 47.

78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake City. The Court
of Appeals may perform any of its functions in any location within the state.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-5, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 48.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Sufficiency of courtroom facilities
as affecting rights of accused, 85 A.L.R.3d 918

CHAPTER 3
DISTRICT COURTS
Section
78-3-1
78-3-1.5.
78-3-2
78-3-3
78-3-4
78-3-5
78-3-6
78-3-7
78-3-8

Section
District judges — Number
78-3-1.6. Repealed
Judicial districts
Term of judges — Vacancy
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to
circuit court — Appeals
Repealed
Terms — Three each year at county
seat
Terms in counties independent of
each other
Courts always open — Adiourn

78-3-9
78-3-10
78-3-11
78-3-12
78-3-13

1 r:

ments from day to day deemed
recesses
Terms to be fixed annually — Clerks
to post copy of order
Court to be held at times fixed —
Exceptions
Adjournment of regular term —
Notice
Disagreement
between
district
judges — Determination
Judge may hold court in anv county
on request
AHrtan/4iim *n
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in state criminal case during its progress as
ground for mistrial, new trial, or reversal, 46
A.L.R.4th 11.

Key Numbers. — Criminal Law e» 857(1).

77-17-12. Defendant on bail appearing for trial may be
committed.
When a defendant who has given bail appears for trial, the court may, at
any time after his appearance for trial, order him to be committed to the
custody of the proper officer to await the judgment or further order of the
court.
History: C. 1953, 77-17-12, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. — Bail *=» 80.

CHAPTER 18
THE JUDGMENT
Section
77-18-1.

77-18-2.
77-18-3.
77-18-4.

Suspension of sentence — Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality —
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termination, revocation, modification, or extension
— Hearings.
Expungement and sealing of
records.
Disposition of fines.
Sentence — Term — Construe

Section
77-18-5.
77-18-5.5.
77-18-6.
77-18-7.
77-18-8.

Reports by courts and prosecuting
attorneys to Board of Pardons.
Judgment of death — Defendant
to select method — Time of selection.
Judgment to pay fine or restitution constitutes a lien.
Costs imposed on defendant —
Restrictions.
Fine not paid — Commitment.

tion.

77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards —
Confidentiality — Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termination, revocation, modification,
or extension — Hearings,
(1) (a) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and
place the defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a
private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court.
511
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(b) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the
department is with the Department of Corrections. The legal custody of
all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court is vested as
ordered by the court. The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(2) (a) The Department of Corrections shall establish suDervision and presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be based on the type of offense, the
demand for services, the availability of agency resources, the public
safety, and other criteria established by the Department of Corrections to
determine what level of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and Board of Pardons on an annual basis for
review and comment prior to adoption by the Department of Corrections.
(c) The Judicial Council and department shall establish procedures to
implement the supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider
modifications to the standards based upon criteria m Subsection (2)(a)
and other criteria as they consider appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations
committee.
(3) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Department of Corrections
is not required to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C
misdemeanors or infractions, or to conduct presentence investigation reports
on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants m accordance with department
standards.
(4) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a
presentence investigation report from the Department of Corrections or
information from other sources about the defendant. The presentence
investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the Department of Corrections regarding the payment of restitution by the defendant. The contents
of the report are confidential and not available except for purposes of
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council a ad for use by the
Department of Corrections.
(b) At the time of sentence, the court shall hear any testimony or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony or information shall be
presented m open court on record and m the presence of the defendant.
(5) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may
be required to perform any or all of the following:
(a) pay, m one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(b) pay amounts required under Chapter 32a, Title 77, Defense Costs;
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(d) participate m available treatment programs;
Addendum p. 4
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(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year;
(f) serve a term of home confinement;
(g) participate in community service restitution programs;
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims in accordance
with Subsections 76-3-201(3) and (4); and
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate.
(6) The Department of Corrections is responsible, upon order of the court,
for the collection of fines and restitution during the probation period in cases
for which the court orders supervised probation by the department. The prosecutor shall provide notice of the restitution order to the clerk of the court. The
clerk shall place the order on the civil docket and shall provide notice of the
order to the parties. The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(7) (a) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C
misdemeanors or infractions. If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the probation period, has outstanding fines or restitution owing,
the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant
on bench probation or place the defendant on bench probation for the
limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines and restitution. Upon
motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own motion, the court may
require the defendant to show cause why his failure to pay should not be
treated as contempt of court or why the suspended jail or prison term
should not be imposed.
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court
and prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will occur by law. The notification shall
include a probation progress report and complete report of details on
outstanding fines and restitution orders.
(8) (a) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to
revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke
the probation. Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or
decision concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of
time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated
at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or
warrant by the court.
(9) (a) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that
the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. Probation may
not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the
conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that
Addendun p. 5
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authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable
cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is
justified. If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be
revoked, modified, or extended.
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing, and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the
hearing. The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. The
order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if
he is indigent. The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to
present evidence.
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of
the affidavit. If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. The defendant may
call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present evidence.
(e) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. Upon a
finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court
may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire
probation term commence anew. If probation is revoked, the defendant
shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(10) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt for "willful
and malicious injury" for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 523, U.S.C.A. 1985.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 59,-§ 2; 1982, ch.
9, § 1; 1983, ch. 47, § 1; 1983, ch. 68, § 1;
1983, ch. 85, § 2; 1984, ch. 20, § 1; 1985, ch.
212, § 17; 1985, ch, 229, § 1; 1987, ch. 114,
§ 1; 1989, ch. 226, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment rewrote this section, as last amended by
Laws 1985, ch. 229, § 1. to the extent that a
detailed analysis is impracticable.
The 1989 amendment, effective April 24,
1989, rewrote Subsections (1), (7)(aj, and (8Kb);
inserted "the public safety" in the second sentence of Subsection (2)(a); inserted "on an annual basis" in Subsection (2Mb); added Subsections (2)(c) through (2)(e) and (5)(j), making related changes in Subsection (5); added the "(a)"
and "(b)" designations in Subsection (4); inserted "upon order of the court" in the first
sentence of Subsection (6) and substituted "enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure" for "under which the victim may seek
civil remedy" in the last sentence of that subsection; deleted "45 days" following "in writing" in the first sentence of Subsection (7)(b);
deleted Subsection (7)(c), concerning extension
of probation; deleted the former first sentence

of Subsection (8)(a), concerning the applicability of time served without violation while on
probation; deleted Subsection (8)(c), which provided: "Nothing in this section precludes the
court from discharging a probationer at any
time, at the discretion of the court"; deleted
"Except as provided in Subsection (7)(c) of this
chapter" from the beginning of Subsection
(9)(a); in Subsection (9)(b), inserted "a warrant
for his arrest or" in the second sentence; and
made stylistic changes throughout the section.
Severability Clause. — Section 3 of Laws
1983, Chapter 85 provided: "If any provision of
this act, or the application of any provision to
any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the
remainder of this act shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application."
Cross-References. — Indecent public display, incarceration without suspension of sentence, § 76-10-1228.
Payment of costs of defense as condition of
probation or suspension, § 77-32a-6.
Presentence investigation reports, Rules
4-607, 6-301, Rules of Judicial Administration,
Rules of Evidence inapplicable to sentencing
and probation proceedings. Rules of Evidence,
Rule 1101.
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fact if neither trustee in mortgage nor owner
of notes pmrticipmted in or had knowledge of
fraud. Ogden State Bank r. Barker (1895) 12
U 27, 40 P 769, citing Pettit v. Parsons (1893)
9 U 223, 33 P 1038. The Pettit case has been
distinguished in 10 U 96,37 P 242.
Debtor has right to prefer one creditor
over another. Ogden State Bank v. Barker
(1895) 12 U 27,40 P 769.
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Collated Reference*
Right of creditors or their representatives
to complain of voluntary transfer or pledge
of corporate assets by corporation which subsequently becomes insolvent, 117 ALR1263.
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Collateral References.
Attorney's fees: conveyance or transfer in
consideration of legal services, rendered Z «
be rendered, as fraudulent as w aMi nt Credl
sT^
tors. 45 ALR 2d 500.
^
*

Future tort, conveyance as fraudulent
where made in contemplation of possible liability for. 38 ALR 3d 597.
Tort claimant's right, prior to judgment, to
attack conveyance or transfer as fraudulent,
73 ALR 2d 749.
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Construction and application.
tio?i3f S n d 0 e S n ? a p p l y w h e r « no question of fraud is raised by the pleadings; nor

any evidence offered relating to such question. Skeen v. Van Sickle (1932) 80 U 419, 15
P 2d 344.
Conveyances between relations.
The mere fact that the transaction is
among close relatives does not necessarily
mean that it is invalid, but the true facts are
subject to proof. Givan v. Lambeth (1960) 10
U 2d 287, 351 P 2d 959.
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Denying relief to one who conveyed his
A note and mortgage executed by son in
property
to defraud his creditors as applicagood faith to secure a preexisting obligation
which the son owed his father was not. a ble where the threatened claim which occafraudulent conveyance. Ned J. Bowman Co v. sioned the conveyance was piaid or was never
established. 21 ALR 2d 589.
White (1962) 13 U 2d 173,369 P 2d 962.
Fact that the parties to a conveyance in
Conveyances between dose relatives are
subject to rigid scrutiny, but the fact that fraud of creditors are not in pari delicto as
close relatives are involved does not render affecting the right of the party guilty of
the conveyance fraudulent. Ned J. Bowman fraud torelief,7 ALR 150.
Future tort, conveyance as fraudulent
Co. v. White (1962) 13 U 2d 173,369 P 2d 962.
where made in contemplation of possible liaConveyance to wife.
bility for, 38 ALR 3d 597.
Where the debtor's wife had both provided
Gift by husband as fraud on wife, 64 ALR
initial funds for purchasing real estate and 466,49 ALR 2d 521.
had held previously owned real estate in her
Gift of debtor's services to third person as
name, fact that property on which husband's
creditors sought judgment lien had been fraud on creditors, 28 ALR 1046.
Liens: use of debtor's individual funds or
transferred from husband to wife did not
establish intent to defraud creditors. property for acquisition* improvement of, or
Hillstead v. Leavitt (1970) 25 U 2d 82, 475 P discharge of liens on, projwrty held in estate
by entireties as a fraud upon creditors, 7
2d 1017.
ALR 2d 1104.
Mortgage: assumption of mortgage as conCollateral References*
sideration for conveyance attacked as in
Fraudulent Conveyances <£=> 24(2).
fraud of creditors, 6 ALR 2d 270.
37 CJS Fraudulent Conveyances § 33.
Principle which denies relief to party who
37 AmJur 2d 697, Fraudulent Conveyances
has conveyed or tranaferred property in
§7.
fraud of his creditors, as affected by execuAdmissibility of declarations of grantor or tion, as part of, or as contemplated at time
transferor on issue as to whether conveyance of, the fraudulent transaction, of
or transfer was in fraud of creditors, 83 ALR reconveyance or retransf er of the property to
1446.
him, 89 ALR 1166.
Priority of judgment over conveyance
Admissibility of testimony of transferee as
to his knowledge, purpose, intention, or good made after beginning of term but prior to
faith on issue whether conveyance was in rendition of judgment, 5 ALR 1072.
Right of grantee or transferee to be reimfraud of transferor's creditors, 52 ALR 2d
bursed for expenditures in payment of taxes
418.
Agreement by husband that wife shall or encumbrances on property where conveyreceive proceeds of sale of homestead as ance or transfer is in fraud of creditors, 8
ALR 527.
fraud on his creditors, 6 ALR 574.
Right of grantee, transferee or mortgagee
Attorney's fees: conveyance or transfer in
consideration of legal services, rendered or to in instrument fraudulent as to creditors to
be rendered, as fraudulent against creditors. protection to extent of consideration paid by
him, 79 ALR 132.
45 ALR 2d 500.
Right of grantor or transferor or his
Conveyance between third persons upon
privies
to attack conveyance or transfer
consideration furnished by debtor as within
application of Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 91 made for purpose of evading taxation, 118
ALR 1184.
ALR 741.
Right of parent as against creditor or
Conveyance or transfer by stockholder as
lienor
to make gift to minor child of latter'a
fraudulent as regards his liability as stockholder to creditors of corporation, 89 ALR own services, 44 ALR 876.
Tort claimant's right, prior to judgment, to
751.
Creditor's receipt of proceeds of convey- attack conveyance or transfer as fraudulent,
ance or transfer by debtor as estopping him 73 ALR 2d 749.
Transfer of property by debtor to corporato claim that conveyance or transfer was
tion, in consideration of its stock, as a fraud
fraudulent, 9 ALR 358.
Creditor's right to attack as fraudulent a on creditors, 85 ALR 133.
Validity and effect as against creditors of
conveyance by third person to debtor's
change of beneficiary or assignment of insurspouse, 35 ALR 2d 8.
8 ance policy from estate to individual, 6 ALR
Addendum p . 8
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FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
Validity as against creditors of trustee or
one deriving his right from trustee, of conveyance or transfer to carry out terms of
unenforceable parol trust, 64 ALR 576.
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Validity of assignment of future book
accounts, 72 ALR 856.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Voluntary conveyance.
accepts deed in good faith, without intent to
Fact that grantee in voluntary conveyance defraud such creditors, will not relieve
does not participate in any fraud asrainat grantee from effect and operation of such
grantor's existing creditors, or that
S 2 conveyance. Ogden State Bank v. Barker
(1895) 12 U 13,40 P 765.
aj£,m»n^!

en

^""vy**** or assignment void- Every conveyance or
D g r otherwi8
h T S ^ •?•
°
*> °* any estate or interest in lands, or
everv^L^L ,
? t?m' 0T ° f r e n t s o r P r o f i t 3 i s a u i n * therefrom, and
o r o ^ t h ^ f P ° ^ i a n d 8 L g 0 o d 8 0 r *"»«• i n « * « or upon the rents or
cToSL? n ^ ! ' madeem*
««• * * « * to delay, hinder or defraud creditors,
d e m ^ I ZST*
° L ^ e i r I a w f u l 9 u i t s - dama * e8 > forfeitures, debts or
« £ £ o t l d r ^ D d ° r I? e r 6 V i d e n C e 0 f d e b t S 1 ™' 9 u i t a f e n c e d ,
M ™ K ? A Judgment suffered, with the like intent, as against the person
hindered, delayed or defrauded shall be void.
^ ^
Hbtory: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907 s a w *
CI* 1917, J583; Ri5.1933 A C 1 9 4 3 . ' a i S *
Compiler's Notes.
,
f meP 3tatUte9
187V
r Laws
,
- ^§"2838.
P - Laws
1876, §^?m?.%
1017; 2 Comp.
1888.

Construction and application.
Statute was not intended to prevent debtor
from paying or securing his honest debts or
from doing equity and exact justice to all of
h.s creditors by placing his mean" X their

53TS

**v-ParaOM (1898) l7 "S

Assignments generally.
Rule that sale or assignment of chattels
unaccompanied by change of possession is'
fraudulent per se as to e x e c u t i o n ^ S ^ o f
or subsequent purchasers from, selle™ or
assignor does not necessarily apply to assiramenu, for benefit of creditors. b u Y l o n ^ S
.n taking possession is circumstance from
be
£ h l f *"&J?ay
P ^ ' ' « * inferred
Snyder v. Murdock (1899) 20 U 419,59 P 91
Conditional sales.
Assignment for benefit of creditors held
void as to seller of personal property n
assignor s possession under contract of condinJSfi 8 * 16 ' C O n d l t i o n o £ w h i c h * " unperformed, since it empowered assignee to sell
assigned property on credit CharTes
Lipmncott & Co. v. Rich (1899) 19 U 140"5

Evidence of fraud.
A prima facie case that property was conveyed to son of one of the defendants with
intent to defraud judgment creditors was
established by evidence indicating both nominal consideration for the property and
defendants' indebtedness at time of conveyance. Brimhall v. Grow (1971) 25 U 2d 298,
480 P 2d 731.
Homesteads.
A homestead cannot be made subject of
attack by a creditor upon ground that it was
sold or conveyed in fraud of such creditor.
Payson Exch. Sav. Bank v. Tietjen (1924) 63
U 321, 225 P 598, explained in 86 U 257, 42
P 2d 989.
Collateral References.
Enforceability, as between parties, of an
executory agreement made in fraud of creditors, 172 ALR 1121.
Excessive security for debt as affecting
question of fraud upon creditors, 138 ALR
1051.
Priority of judgment over conveyance
made after beginning of term but pnor to
rendition of judgment, 5 ALR 1072.
Rents and profits: accountability and liability for rents and profits of grantee of fraudulently conveyed real property, 60 ALR 2d 593.
Right of wife or child by virtue of right to
support to maintain action to set aside conveyance by husband or parent as fraudulent,
without reducing claim to judgment, 164
ALR 524.
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DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Mercantile Co. v. Mt. Pleasant Equitable
Construction and application.
This section is substantially the same as 13 Co-op. Inst. (1894) 12 U 213, 42 P 86SI distinEliz. c 5, and is merely declaratory of the guished in 15 U 110, 47 P 604 and 18 U 42,
..
principles of the common law. United States 55P77.
As general rule, assignment which is void
v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
in part is void in its entirety. W. P. Noble
Saints (1888) 5 U 538,18 P 35.
Under this section the assignment of the Mercantile Co. v. Mt Pleasant Equitable
corporate property of the Church of Jesus ( ^ p . Iiist (1894) 12 U 213, 42 P ^ d i s t i n Christ of Latter-Day Saints, pending dissolu- guished in 15 U 110, 47 P 604 and 18 U 42,
tion of that corporation by Act of Congress, 55P77.
was held in fraud of the rights of the government and void as to the receiver, the govern- Presumption of fraud.
Where grantor was heavily indebted at
ment being included in the words "other
persons." United States v. Church of Jesus time of his execution of voluntary conveyChrist of Latter-Day Saints (1888) 5 U 538, ance, inference is that conveyance was fraudulently made for purpose of hindering and
18P35.
Insolvency is not required to make this delaying grantor's creditors. Ogden State
section operative. Ogden State Bank v. Bank v. Barker (1895) 12 U13,40 P 765.
Barker (1895) 12 U 13,40 P 765.
Right of corporate directors to prefer
Assignments generally.
themselves.
Under former statute an assignment of
Where corporation lias become insolvent
property was not void which among other and abandoned objects for which it was crethings provided that the assignees out of the ated, its directors cannot by voluntary deed
proceeds of "personal property" pay, and of assignment prefer themselves, as corpothat assignees accept trust and agree to exe- rate creditors, over other such creditors
cute same by disposing of the property and whose claims are equidly meritorious, so as
collecting the choses in action due assignor to secure advantage over latter by reason of
and applying proceeds to payment of debts. directors' official positions and their conseIt does not confer authority to sell on credit quent superior knowledge of corporation's
Sprecht v. Parsons (1891) 7 U 107,25 P 730.
affairs. W. P. Noble Mercantile Co. v. Mt.
Pleasant Equitable Co-op. Inst (1894) 12 U
Extent of invalidity of assignment.
As general rule, assignment which is 213, 42 P 869, distinguished in 15 U 110, 47
fraudulent in fact is void in toto. W. P. Noble P 604 and 18 U 42,55 P 77.

25-1-9. Defrauding prior or subsequent purchasers — Effect of
notice at time of purchase. Every conveyance of any estate or interest
in lands, or the rents or profits of lands, and every charge upon lands, or
the rents or profits thereof, made or created with intent to defraud prior
or subsequent purchasers thereof for a valuable consideration shall be void
as against such purchasers. But no such conveyance or charge shall be
deemed fraudulent in favor of a subsequent purchaser who had actual or
constructive notice thereof at the time of his purchase, unless it appears
that the grantee in such conveyance, or the person to be benefited by such
charge, was privy to the fraud intended.
History: R.S. 1898 & OL. 1907, $§2464,
2465; CX. 1917, §§ 5814, 5815; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943,33-1-9.
Compiler's Notes.
Analogous former statute, 2 Comp. Laws
1888, §2833.

Mortgagor remaining in possession.
Mortgage on stock of merchandise held
fraudulent as to judgment creditor of mortgagor, where mortgagor remained in possession of mortgaged property and continued to
sell it in usual course of business pursuant to
merely verbal agreement with mortgagee,
which agreement contemplated that mortgage was not to be paid on its due date but

10
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Laws 1988 Chapter 59, §16
(See Legislative History under §25-6-1, Addm. p. 12)
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Doctrine of Part
Performance as Applied to Oral Land Contracts in Utah, 9 Utah L. Rev. 91.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific Performance §§ 19, 20.

C.J.S. — 81 CJ.S. Specific Performance
§§ 44, 45.
Key Numbers. — Specific Performance «=»
39 e t geq

25-5-9. Agent may sign for principal.
Every instrument required by the provisions of this chapter to be subscribed
by any party may be subscribed by the lawful agent of such party.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, 5 2478;
CX. 1917, § 5825; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
33-5-9.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Authorization from only one joint tenant.
Husband could not bind wife, who was joint
tenant, by contract to purchase the common
property since she had not signed the contract

nor given written authority to agent to sign for
her. Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah
1986).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of
Frauds § 379 et seq.

Key Numbers. — Frauds, Statute of
116(1).

CHAPTER 6
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER
ACT
Section
25-6-1.
25-6-2.
25-6-3.
25-6-4.
25-6-5.
25-6-6.

Short title.
Definitions.
Insolvency.
Value — Transfer.
Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or after transfer.
Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before transfer.

Section
25-6-7.
25-6-8.
25-6-9.
25-6-10.
25-6-11.

Transfer — When made.
Remedies of creditors.
Good faith transfer.
Claim for relief — Time limits.
Legal principles applicable to chapter.
25-6-12. Construction of chapter.
25-6-13. Applicability of chapter.

25-6-1. Short title.
This chapter, is known as the "Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act."
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-1, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, i 1; recompiled as C. 1953,
2d-£-l.
Comparable Provisions. — Other jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act include: Arkansas, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota,

Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Texas, Washington, and West Virginia.
Compiler's Notes. — This chapter was enacted as §§ 25A-1-1 to 25A-1-13; it has been
renumbered and all internal references corrected accordingly under instruction from the
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Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
Cross-References. — Uniform Commercial
Code — Sales, § 70A-2-101 et seq.

Uniform Commercial Code — Bulk Transfers, § 70A-6-101 et seq.
Defrauding creditors as a misdemeanor,
§ 76-6-511.
Statute of limitations, § 78-12-26(3).

25-6-2. Definitions.
In this chapter
(1) "Affiliate" means:
(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with
power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding voting securities of the
debtor, other than a person who holds the securities:
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to
vote the securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the
power to vote;
(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to
vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the outstanding
voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the
securities:
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the
power to vote;
(c) a person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease
or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are
controlled by the debtor; or
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business under a lease or
other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor's assets.
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not include:
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;
(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the
extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against
only one tenant.
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or
unsecured.
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim.
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim.
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim.
(7) "Insider" includes:
(a) if the debtor is an individual:
(i) a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
(ii) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
22
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(iii) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection
(7)(a)(ii); or
(iv) a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or
person in control;
(b) if the debtor is a corporation:
(i) a director of the debtor;
(ii) an officer of the debtor;
(iii) a person in control of the debtor;
(iv) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(v) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection
(7)(b)(iv); or
(vi) a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person
in control of the debtor;
(c) if the debtor is a partnership:
(i) a general partner in the debtor;
(ii) a relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a
person in control of the debtor;
(iii) another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection
(7)(c)(iii); or
(v) a person in control of the debtor;
(d) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were
the debtor; and
(e) a managing agent of the debtor.
(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in property to secure
payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security
interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien.
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, corporation, association, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency,
business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of ownership.
(11) "Relative" means an individual or an individual related to a
spouse, related by consanguinity within the third degree as determined
by the common law, or a spouse, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree.
(12) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, or voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an
asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release,
lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.
(13) "Valid lien" means a lien that is effective against the holder of a
judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-2, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 2; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-2.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Creditors.
Construction and application.
Intent.
Creditors.
Persons having claim in tort against grantor
which was not reduced to judgment at time of
alleged fraudulent conveyance held "creditor"
within meaning of this section. Zuniga v.
Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P.2d 513, 101 A.LJL
532 (1935).
Construction and application.
This section should be construed with liber-

ality so as to reach all artifices and evasions
designed to rob the act of its full force and effect in preventing debtorsfrompaying the just
claims of their creditors. Butler v. Wilkinson,
740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987).
Intent
Where debtors engaged in a Ponzi scheme,
the debtors' fraudulent intent was established
as a matter of law, notwithstanding the bankruptcy trustee's burden of proving each element of a fraudulent conveyance by clear and
convincing evidence under this chapter. Merrill v. Abbott (In re Independent Clearing
House Co.), 77 Bankr. 843 (D. Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Right of secured creditor to have set aside
Utah Law Review. — The Bankrupt's
Spouse: The Forgotten Character in the Bank- fraudulent transfer of other property by his
ruptcy Drama, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 709, 722. debtor, 8 A.L.R.4th 1123.
A.L.R. — Future tort, conveyance as frauduConspiracy, right of creditor to recover damlent where made in contemplation of possible ages for conspiracy to defraud him of claim, 11
liability for, 38 AJLR.3d 597.
Rule denying recovery of property to one who A.L.R.4th 345.
Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances
conveyed to defraud creditors as applicable
where the claim which motivated the convey- •» 5.
ance was never established, 6 A.L.R.4th 862.

25-6-3. Insolvency.
(1) A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater than all
of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation.
(2) A debtor who is generally not paying his debts as they become due is
presumed to be insolvent.
(3) A partnership is insolvent under Subsection (1) if the sum of the partnership's debts is greater than the aggregate, at a fair valuation, of all of the
partnership's assets and the sum of the excess of the value of each general
partner's nonpartnership assets over the partner's nonpartnership debts.
(4) Assets under this section do not include property that has been transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors
or that has been transferred in a manner making the transfer voidable under
this chapter.
(5) Debts under this section do not include an obligation to the extent it is
secured by a valid lien on property of the debtor not included as an asset.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-3, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 3; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-3.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

. ,
Allegation of insolvency.
Determination of insolvency.
Allegation of insolvency.
Allegation of insolvency in a complaint in an
action to set aside a conveyance was sufficient
as against contention that it was a conclusion,
Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198,48 P.2d 513,101
A.L.R. 532 (1935).
Determination of insolvency.
The determination of insolvency under this
section is not the same as the determination of
r

insolvency in the bankruptcy sense, as this section requires merely a showing that the party's
aaaetg m
nQt 8 u f f i c i e n t to m e e t liabilities as
CQT? ^
they ^ ^
d u e Meyej. y Q m a l ^
569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977).
In an action by a creditor to set aside an
allegedly fraudulent conveyance of ieal estate
by a debtor, the plaintiff did not demonstrate
that the debtor was insolvent where the only
evidence was that the debtor submitted two
checks that were returned unpaid. Furniture
Mfro. Sales, Inc. v. Deamer, 680 P.2d 398
(Utah 1984).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Imputation of insolvency as defamatory, 49 A.L.R.3d 163.

Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances
*=> 57(1).

25-6-4. Value — Transfer.
(1) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the
transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured
or satisfied. However, value does not include an unperformed promise made
other than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business to fiirnish support
to the debtor or another person.
(2) Under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) and Section 25-6-6, a person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an
asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of the
debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement.
(3) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the debtor
and the transferee is intended by them to be contemporaneous and is in fact
substantially contemporaneous.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-4, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 4; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-4.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or after transfer.
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the
debtor; or
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
the transfer or obligation; and the debtor:
25
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(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably
small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they
became due.
(2) To determine "actual intent" under Subsection (l)(a), consideration may
be given, among other factors, to whether:
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred
after the transfer;
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor
had been sued or threatened with suit;
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(f) the debtor absconded;
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the
obligation incurred;
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial
debt was incurred; and
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a
lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
History- C. 1953, 25A-1-5, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 5; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-5.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59

became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
Cross-References. — Defrauding creditors
as a misdemeanor, § 76-6-511.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

. .
,
R d es of
fraud
Construction and application.
Constructive trust.
Conveyances between relatives.
FvirfpnfP

Whether an assignment of an interest in an
estate was in good faith and not to hinder, de* a v o r defraud creditors, or was made for such
P ^ a e . Spends upon the facts and circumstance
* surrounding the transaction, as gath« * * « * * h e ***** *
^ p l ? ^
Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063

EiViuence.

(1Q421

Fair consideration.
"Good faith" transfer.
Mortgagor remaining in possession.
Parent and child.
Assignments,
Rule that sale or assignment of chattels, unaccompanied by change of possession, is fraudulent per se as to execution creditors of, or subsequent purchasers from, seller or assignor
does not necessarily apply to assignments for
benefit of creditors, but long delay in taking
possession is circumstance from which fraud
may be pnma facie inferred. Snyder v. Murdock, 20 Utah 419, 59 P. 91 (1899).

VJ.JJ**J.

ANALYSIS

Badges of fraud.
Although actual fraudulent intent must be
shown to hold a conveyance fraudulent, its existence may be inferred from the presence of
certain indicia of fraud or "badges of fraud."
Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420
(Utah 1986).
"Badges of fraud," from which actual intent
may be inferred, include, inter alia, a debtors
(1) continuing in possession and evidencing the
prerequisites of property ownership after having formally conveyed all his interest in the
property, (2) making a conveyance in anticipa-
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tion of litigation, and (3) making a conveyance
to a family member without receiving fair consideration. Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726
P.2d 420 (Utah 1986).
Construction and application.
Statute was not intended to prevent debtor
from paying or securing his honest debts, or
from doing equity and exact justice to all of his
creditors by placing his means at their disposal. Billings v. Parsons, 17 Utah 22, 53 P.
730 (1898).
Constructive trust.
A constructive trust was properly imposed to
prevent unjust enrichment, where the proceeds
from the sale of fraudulently conveyed land,
which were in excess of the purchase price, had
been paid into court, and a subsequent conveyance to a third-party purchaser for value without notice could not be voided. Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987).
Conveyances between relatives.
Conveyances between near relatives, calculated to prevent a creditor from realizing on his
claim against one of such relatives, are subject
to rigid scrutiny. Paxton v. Paxton, 80 Utah
540, 15 P.2d 1051 (1932).
The mere fact that the transaction is among
close relatives does not necessarily mean that
it is invalid, but the true facts are subject to
proof. Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351
P.2d 959 (1960).
A note and mortgage executed by son in good
faith to secure a preexisting obligation which
the son owed his father was not a fraudulent
conveyance. Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 13
Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962).
Conveyances between close relatives are
subject to rigid scrutiny, but the fact that close
relatives are involved does not render the conveyance fraudulent. Ned J. Bowman Co. v.
White, 13 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962).
Evidence.
Whether an assignment of an interest in an
estate was in good faith and not to hinder, delay or defraud creditors depends upon the facts
and circumstances surrounding the transaction, as gathered from the badges of fraud
present. Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126
P.2d 1063 (1942).
In an action on notes executed by the defendants and to establish a lien on property conveyed by one of the defendants to his children,
the evidence was sufficient to sustain the lower
court's findings that the conveyances were not
fraudulent and to sustain a judgment denying
a lien. Givan v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351
P.2d 959 (1960).
Whether a conveyance is fraudulent as to
creditors must be determined from the facts of
each case and from the circumstances surrounding the transaction, keeping in mind that

25-6-5

the purpose of the Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(now see the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act) is not to prevent a debtor from securing
his honest debt. Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White,
13 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962).
Fair consideration.
Where there is a valuable consideration
which is stated to be fair, equivalent for, and
not disproportionate to the value of the property conveyed, the requirement as to allegations and proof of fraud is more exacting.
Smith v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244, 17 P.2d 264
(1932).
Where wife owned a substantial interest in a
joint bank account and husband executed a
note to the wife at her request upon withdrawing a substantial sum from such account to invest in a hazardous business, and when it became due, husband executed renewal note secured by mortgage on undivided one-half interest in property owned by them jointly, the original interest note was supported by valuable
consideration, and, hence, the mortgage was
not fraudulent as to creditors. Williams v. Peterson, 86 Utah 526, 46 P.2d 674 (1935).
Conveyance of property worth $14,000 to
$15,000, which netted only about $180 a year,
to party in satisfaction of preexisting debt of
$10,000 was not a fraudulent conveyance.
Utah Assets Corp. v. Dooley Bros. Ass'n, 92
Utah 577, 70 P.2d 738 (1937).
A debt barred by the statute of limitations
may nevertheless be consideration for the assignment of an interest in an estate, even as
between close relatives. Boccalero v. Bee, 102
Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063 (1942).
In suit to set aside conveyance from husband
to wife, no actual fraudulent intent will be required, when there was no fair value or consideration given, and the effect of the transfer is
to render the grantor insolvent. Cardon v. Harper, 106 Utah 560,151 P.2d 99,154 A.L.R. 906
(1944).
A conveyance was not made in good faith,
and there was a failure of fair consideration,
where purchaser knew that the purchase price
of an item was approximately only one-tenth
the value of the item. Meyer v. General Am.
Corp., 569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977).
Satisfaction of an obligation owed the transferee by a third party did not qualify as fair
consideration
under
former
§ 25-1-4.
Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420
(Utah 1986).
An otherwise fraudulent transfer is not
made nonfraudulent because traiisfer is made
to satisfy a third party's obligation to the
transferee even if the thirty party is a corporation set up by the transferor. Daimken, Inc. v.
Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986).
"Good faith" transfer.
Proof that a transferee of property knows
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that the transferor-debtor has preferred the
transferee over other creditors or that the
transferee actively sought the preference from
the debtor does not support the conclusion that
the transferee lacks good faith under former
§ 25-1-7. Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244
(Utah 1987).
Mortgagor remaining in possession.
Mortgage on stock of merchandise was
fraudulent as to judgment creditor of mortgagor, where mortgagor remained in possession of mortgaged property and continued to
sell it in usual course of business pursuant to
merely verbal agreement with mortgagee,
which agreement contemplated that mortgage

was not to be paid on its due date but was to be
extended from time to time. McKibbon v. Brigham, 18 Utah 78, 55 P. 66 (1898).
Parent and child.
Labor performed for parents by children during their minority will not entitle such child r e n to
compensation, so as to establish relation of debtor and creditor and permit parents
lawfully to prefer children, convey their propertv
to them, and thus place property out of
reach of parents' creditors whose claims were
in existence at time of deed's execution. Ogden
State Bank v. Barker, 12 Utah 13, 40 P. 765
(1895).

COLLATERAL, KE*U;KENCES

AX.R. — Future tort, conveyance as fraudu- Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances
lent where made in contemplation of possible <*=» 24(2), 71, 76(1).
liability for, 38 A.L.IL3d 597.

25-6-6, Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before transfer.
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a
creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred if:
(a) the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or
obligation and the debtor was insolvent at the time; or
(b) the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.
(2) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim
arose before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for
an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at the time, and the insider had
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-6, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 6; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-6.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Mortgage.
A mortgage made without fair consideration,
which will render the person making it insolvent, constitutes statutory fraud, and the exis-

tence of a subjective intention to defraud is not
required. Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White, 13
Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances
*=» 74(1).
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25-6-7. Transfer — When made.
In this chapter:
(1) A transfer is made:
(a) with respect to an asset that is real property other than a fixture, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of the asset, when the transfer is so far perfected
that a good-faith purchaser of the asset from the debtor against
whom applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset that is superior to the interest of the
transferee; and
(b) with respect to an asset that is not real property or that is a
fixture, when the transfer is so far perfected that a creditor on a
simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien other than under this
chapter that is superior to the interest of the transferee.
(2) If applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected as provided in
Subsection (1) and the transfer is not so perfected before the commencement of an action for relief under this chapter, the transfer is deemed
made immediately before the commencement of the action.
(3) If applicable law does not permit the transfer to be perfected as
provided in Subsection (1), the transfer is made when it becomes effective
between the debtor and the transferee.
(4) A transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the
asset transferred.
(5) An obligation is incurred:
(a) if oral, when it becomes effective between the parties; or
(b) if evidenced by a writing, when the writing executed by the
obligor is delivered to or for the benefit of the obligee.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-7, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 7; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-7.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59

became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
Cross-References. — Secured transactions,
Chapter 9 of Title 70A.

25-6-8. Remedies of creditors.
(1) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this chapter, a creditor, subject to the limitations in Section 25-6-9, may obtain:
(a) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to
satisfy the creditor's claim;
(b) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(c) subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance with
applicable rules of civil procedure:
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a
transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property;
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or of other property of the transferee; or
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require.
(2) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the
creditor, if the court orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or its
proceeds.
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History: C. 1953, 25A-1-8, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 8; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-8.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Garnishment proceeding.
Pleadings.
Presumptions and burden of proof.
Garnishment proceeding.
Fact that pleadings in garnishment proceedings revealed that indebtedness sued upon was
that of individuals and that those individuals
had no account with garnishee bank, the only
account being with corporation owned by individuals, did not make cause of action one, under this section, to set aside conveyance, and
thus argument that court had never obtained
jurisdiction of corporate defendant or of res
since no service of summons was made upon
corporation could not be maintained; the pleading sufficiently averred a sham transaction between the individuals and the corporation so
that they should be considered as identical for
purpose of garnishment proceedings. Stine v.
Girola, 9 Utah 2d 22, 337 P.2d 62 (1959).
Transfer of stock could be set aside as a
fraudulent conveyance on motion in garnishment proceeding, and it was not necessary to
file a separate action to obtain such relief.
Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519 P.2d 236
(1974).
Pleadings.
Allegations in an action to set aside convey-

ances that the conveyances were made for the
purpose of placing the property beyond the
reach of creditors and were made as part of a
scheme, without a statement of the facts from
which the purpose could be inferred, and without stating facts constituting the scheme,
amounted to no more than the mere statement
that the conveyances were fraudulent. Smith
v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244, 17 P.2d 264 (1932).
Complaint in an action to set aside a conveyance was not objectionable for failure to allege
that the property involved in the conveyance
was not exempt. Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198,
48 P.2d 513, 101 A.L.R. 532 (1935).
Presumptions and burden of proof.
Where grantees were in possession of premises pursuant to a duly recorded deed and were
paying taxes thereon, it was incumbent upon
plaintiffs, in an action to set aside conveyance,
to allege and prove that grantees as such did
certain acts held themselves out in a way that
misled plaintiffs and that plaintiffs had knowledge and relied thereon. Smith v. Edwards, 81
Utah 244, 17 P.2d 264 (1932).
Burden of proof is not on plaintiff to show
that property alleged to have been fraudulently conveyed is not exempt from execution.
Cardon v. Harper, 106 Utah 560, 151 P.2d 99,
154 A.L.R. 906 (1944).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances
* 217, 226 et seq.

25-6-9. Good faith transfer.
(1) A transfer or obligation is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a)
against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value
or against any subsequent transferee or obligee.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent a transfer is
voidable in an action by a creditor under Subsection 25-6-8(l)(a), the creditor
may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted under
Subsection (3), or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, whichever is less. The judgment may be entered against:
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the
transfer was made; or
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a good faith transferee who
took for value or from any subsequent transferee.
(3) If the judgment under Subsection (2) is based upon the value of the asset
transferred, the judgment must be for an amount equal to the value of the
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asset at the time of the transfer, subject to an adjustment as equities may
require.
(4) Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an obligation under this
chapter, a good-faith transferee or obligee is entitled, to the extent of the
value given the debtor for the transfer or obligation, to:
(a) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset transferred;
(b) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or
(c) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the judgment.
(5) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) or Section
25-6-6 if the transfer results from:
(a) termination of a lease upon default by the debtor when the termination is pursuant to the lease and applicable law; or
(b) enforcement of a security interest in compliance with Chapter 9,
Title 70A, the Uniform Commercial Code.
(6) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-6(2):
(a) to the extent the insider gave new value to or for the benefit of the
debtor after the transfer was made unless the new value was secured by a
valid lien;
(b) if made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the insider; or
(c) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabilitate the debtor and
the transfer secured present value given for that purpose as well as an
antecedent debt of the debtor.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-9, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 9; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-9.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Consideration.
Constructive trust.
Good faith.
Previous notice of fraud.
Purchaser.
Consideration.
The term "consideration" as used in former
25-1-13 includes both a conveyance of "property" and satisfaction of an antecedent debt.
Merrill v. Abbott (In re Independent Clearing
House Co.), 77 Bankr. 843 (D. Utah 1987).
An investor in a Ponzi scheme gave "valuable consideration" for the transfers he received to the extent the transfers did not exceed his undertaking, but did not give valuable
consideration for a transfer to the extent the
transfer exceeded the amount of his undertaking. Therefore, for such transfers, former
§ 25-1-13 was no defense. Merrill v. Abbott (In
r
* Independent Clearing House Co.), 77 Bankr.
iD. Utah 1987).
constructive trust.
A constructive trust was properly imposed to
prevent unjust enrichment, where the proceeds

from the sale of fraudulently conveyed land,
which were in excess of the purchase price, had
been paid into court, and a subsequent conveyance to a third-party purchaser for value without notice could not be voided. Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987).
Good faith.
A conveyance will fail for lack of "fair consideration" if the party seeking to avoid the
conveyance can show that the transferee did
not take "in good faith." Merrill v. Abbott (In
re Independent Clearing House Co.), 77 Bankr.
843 (D. Utah 1987).
Previous notice of fraud.
The mere fact that an investment promises
to pay a high rate of return may not, without
more, put one on notice that it is fraudulent.
Therefore, that fact alone may not mean that
the investors in a Ponzi scheme had previous
notice of the debtors' fraud, especially when
the debtors actually paid the promised returns
until the scheme collapsed. Merrill v. Abbott
(In re Independent Clearing House Co.), 77
Bankr. 843 (D. Utah 1987).
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Purchaser.
The term "purchaser" as used in former
§ 25-1-13 includes anyone who acquires title to

property through a voluntary transfer. Merrill
v. Abbott (In re Independent Clearing House
Co.), 77 Bankr. 843 (D. Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances
*» 192.

25-6-10. Claim for relief — Time limits.
A claim for relief or cause of action regarding a fraudulent transfer or
obligation under this chapter is extinguished unless action is brought:
(1) under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), within four years after the transfer
was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year after
the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered
by the claimant;
(2) under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) or 25-6-6(1), within four years after
the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; or
(3) under Subsection 25-6-6(2), within one year after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-10, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 10; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-10.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

25-6-11. Legal principles applicable to chapter.
Unless displaced by this chapter, the principles of law and equity, including
merchant law and the law relating to principal and agent, equitable subordination, estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake,
insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement this chapter's provisions.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-11, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 11; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-G-ll.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

25-6-12. Construction of chapter.
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose
to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among
states enacting it.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-12, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 59, § 12; recompiled as C. 1953,
25-6-12.

Effective Dates. — Liws 1988, Chapter 59
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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25-6-13. Applicability of chapter.
This act applies when any transfer occurs after the effective date of this act.
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-13, enacted by L. 78-12-29, and which was effectiive April 25,
1988, ch. 59, § 13; recompiled as C. 1953, 1988. The reference probably should be to "this
25-6-13.
chapter."
Compiler's Notes. — The term "this act"
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59
means Laws 1988, Chapter 59, which appears became effective on April 25,1983, pursuant to
as §§ 25-6-1 to 25-6-13, 78-12-25, and Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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Rule 32. Interest on judgment.
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money in a civil case is
affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law shall be payable from the date
the judgment was entered in the trial court.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Running of interest on judgment where both
Error § 941.
parties appeal, 11 A.L.R.4th 1099.
C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1979.
Retrospective application and effect of state
A.L.R. — Date from which interest on judg- statute or rule allowing interest or changing
ment starts running, as affected by modifica- rate of interest on judgments or verdicts. 41
tion of amount of judgment on appeal, 4 A.L.R.4th 694.
A.L.R.3d 1221.
Key Numbers. — Interest «=> 39(2).
Right to interest pending appeal, 15
A.L.R.3d 411.

Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery
of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34,
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion,
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
to P r o c e d u r e s .
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of
the appellees motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of
the appellees brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other
paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of
oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the
court shall grant a hearing.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Frivolous appeal.
—Defined.
—Sanctions.
Compiler's Notes. — All of the following
annotations are taken from cases decided under former Rule 33, R. Utah S. Ct., or former
Rule 33, R. Utah Ct. App.
Frivolous appeal.
A husband's appeal from a judgment relating to alimony and distribution of marital
property was frivolous, where there was no basis for the argument presented and the evidence and law was mischaracterized and misstated. Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (Utah
1987).
—Defined.
For purposes of this rule, a "frivolous" appeal
is one having no reasonable legal or factual

basis, as defined in Rule 40(a). Lack of good
faith is not required. O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d
306 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
A frivolous appeal is one without reasonable
legal or factual basis as defined in Rule 40(a).
Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall,
751 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
A frivolous appeal is one without reasonable
legal or factual basis. Maughan v. Maughan,
770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
—Sanctions.
Sanctions for frivolous appeals should only
be applied in egregious cases, to avoid chilling
the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions. However, sanctions should be imposed
when an appeal is obviously without any merit
and has been taken with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing. Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Maughan v. Maughan,
770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error § 912.
C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1358.
AJLR. — Inherent power of federal district

court to impose monetary sanctions on counsel
in absence of contempt of court, 77 A.L.R. Fed.
789.
Key Numbers. — Costs *=> 259 to 263.

Rule 34. Award of costs.
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appealis
dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed
by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs
shall be taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or
order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the appellee unless otherwise
ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated,
costs shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall not be allowed or
taxed in a criminal case.
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. In cases involving the state
of Utah or an agency or officer thereof, an award of costs for or against the
state shall be at the discretion of the court unless specifically required or
prohibited by law.
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record, bonds and other expenses on appeal. The following may be taxed as costs in favor of the prevailing party in the appeal: the actual costs of a printed or typewritten brief or
memoranda and attachments not to exceed $3.00 for each page; actual costs
incurred in the preparation and transmission of the record, including costs^of
the reporter's transcript unless otherwise ordered by the court; premiums paid
for supersedeas or cost bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the fees
for filing and docketing the appeal.
(d) Bill of costs taxed after remittitur. When costs are awarded to a party
in an appeal, a party claiming costs shall, within 15 days after the remittitur
is filed with the clerk of the trial court, serve upon the adverse party and file
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with the clerk of the trial court an itemized and verified bill of costs The
adverse party may within 5 days of service of the bill of costs serve and file a
notice of objection, together with a motion to have the costs taxed by the rial
court, If there is no objection to the cost bill within the allotted time the clerk
of the trial court shall tax the costs as filed and enter judgment for t h S
entitled thereto, which judgment shall be entered in the jud^nen docket w S
die same force and effect as m the case of other judgments ofrecordL IftheTost
S ^ n ^ S S ? *T " ^
J ° P P ° S e d ' t h e c 1 * ^ u P° n reasonable notke
l
w l^flt
* * l h e C0StS " * e n t e r a f l n a i determination and judgment
U P O n be er ered n t h e
r5rf£S,^fS
i
J u d ^ n t docket with the sameTrce
f ;i
and effect as m the case of other judgments ofrecord. The determination of the

cases on appeal from a trial court. Within 15 days after S^expiratfon of the
time m which a petition for rehearing may be filed or within i T d a ^ s X r an
order denying such a petition, the party to whom costs have been awarded
may file with the clerk of the appellate court and serve upon the adverapartv
an itemized and verified bill of costs. The adverse party may within 5 d^vs
after the service of the bill of costs file a notice of
IbjeZt^TamAonll
have the coste taxed by the clerk. If no objection to the cost bill is filed wSiin
the allotted time, the clerk shall thereupon tax the costs and enter j u d S e S
against the adverse party. If the adverse party timely objects to the cosTbiU
o s t f £ r V ™ 0 1 1 ^ 1 6 n 0 t ! T H n d lM ? rin »» s h a 1 1 d e t e r m i n ^ and settle the
costs, tax the same and a judgment shall be entered thereon against the
adverse party. The determination by the clerk shall be reviewable by he
court upon the request of either party made within 5 days of the entry tf
judgmen ; unless otherwise ordered, oral argument shall not be p e l t e d A
judgment under this section may be filed with the clerk of any dis?ri™court in
the state, who shall docket a certified copy of the same in the manne^and
with the same force and effect as judgments of the district courT
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
P
Error §§ 1009 to 1024.

C I <? * r T c A
I JT,
Kev N^JL
^
" ^ E m T § 1979 "
Key Numbers. — Costs «= 221 et seq.

Rule 35. Petition for rehearing.
(a) Time for filing; contents: answer; oral argument not permitted A
rehearing will not be granted m the absence of a petition for r ! S r m e A
P
n
T he
be
; ™S™y
Me* ^ t h the clerk within 14 d a y f X / t h t
e nSv° f £
entry of the decision of the court, unless the time is shortened or enlarged by
S a U St
whth S f i S
^
T W U h P ^ ^ ^ t y the points of law or fact
which the petitioner claims he court has overlooked or misapprehended and
hall contain such argument in support
of the petition as the petitioner deertif
K S ' . * f r df df al yt l o n rfa imau s t cument
y i that
the petition is presented in good
n
n^t / M °
- ° 3 P G tf8f
support
of the petition will not be
l0n f r rehearin
S 2 ?d £ ?i? "C " T n S e an eT l t the
°
S
will
be received unless reS n iI A
°T- 3 ? r }°
P e t i t i °n ^ rehearing shall be filed
within 14 days after the entry of the order requesting the answer, unless
459
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MINUTE BOOK FORM 101

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
County of Salt Lake - State of Utah
PHPNO
TITLE:

(*• PARTIES PRESENT)

COUNSEL:

M.ai-uvxLs

COUNSEL PRESENT)

&VLL& y
*

&

&

7/a*i fyujALML/

sMfc^A
(J*.
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PAOE

O J ^ ^

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attornev
ERNIE JONES
^°*ney
Deputy County
Attorney
South
lSalt
l l + ?Lake
* l 42?
' Su84111
ite 300
City, UT
Telephone: (801) 363-7900

1

I

f

\

*,

»

'*« J t A v . .""•;'; S.^ft ^ j ,
V
v . A* .

•' ^i ill '. -' >

I

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

RESTITUTION ORDER

v.
Case No. CR 87-172

IRENE HOOK,
Defendant.

The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on
the 17th day of August, 1987 before the Honorable Raymond S. Uno,
one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, sitting without a
jury.

The Defendant was present and represented by Attorney

Cornelius Van Drunen.

The

State of Utah was represented by Ernie

Jones, Deputy County Attorney.
evidence, both oral *T.A
oral

and

The

aocumentary

Court
and

having
having

received
heard

the

arguments of counsel and having made and entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law herein,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED. ADJUDGED AND DECREED
AS FOLLOWS:
1. That the Defendant, Irene Hook, has unlawfully taken
from Harris-Dudley PlumMnn. n
7
^ i u m b l ng Co., Inc. the sum of Three Hundred

Ninety Nine Thousand Dollars ($399,GOO.00) during the period from
1969 up to the time of the termination of her employment on
December 3, 1986.
2.

That Judgment be and the same is hereby granted against

the Defendant and in favor of Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co., Inc. in
the

amount

of

Three

Hundred

Ninety

Nine

Thousand

Dollars

($399,000.00) and the Defendant, Irene Hook, is hereby ordered to
pay by way of restitution the aforesaid sum of Three Hundred
Ninety-Nine

Thousand

Dollars

($399,000.00)

to

Harris

Dudley

Plumbing Co., Inc. for the unlawful sums taken by the Defendant
as aforesaid.
3.

That the Defendant may, within thirty (30) days from

the date of the restitution hearing on August 17, 1987, undertake
and complete a review and verification of the accuracy of the
books and records of Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co., Inc. and the
aforesaid audit thereof determining the amount unlawfully taken
by the Defendant.

If the Defendant finds that the said books and

records of Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co., Inc and/or the aforesaid
audit are erroneous and that the amount of the Restitution Order
should be increased or decreased accordingly, then such shall be
called to the attention of the Court by the Defendant within the
aforesaid thirty (30) day period, whereupon the Court shall set
the matter for further hearing for the purpose of determining
whether or not there has been an error in the audit which should
result in the increase or decrease in the aforesaid judgment.
4<

Adult

Probation

and

Parole,

is

responsible

for

collecting and transmitting to Harris-Hudley Plumbing Co., Inc.
all restitution payments while the Defendant is on probation.
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V...

day of September, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

By:

^^^iQX^

RAYMOND S . UNO

Approved as to Form:
;

/^s
£LL

/

Ernie Jones/
Deputy Coitfity A t t o r n e y

L;Omelius Van Drunen

l

/r
\ ^ Deputy C - .

.ha

;AR

£8865
Ilacoy A. KcMurray 42214
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON
Attorneys for Third Party
Judgment Creditors
The Hermes Building
455 East Fifth South
Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5125

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah

MAR 2 4 1988
H^Otf

Oepuiy Clefk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,

Tot^

STATE OF UTAH

^>bC

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaa.nta.ff,

MOTION FOR ORDER IN
SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDING
AND ORDER

v.
IRENE HOOK,

Case No^. CB 87-172^
Defendant.
Judge Raymond S. Uno
HARRIS-DUDLEY PLUMBING CO., INC,
a Utah corporation,

NOTICE

Third Party
Judgment Creditor,

v.
IRENE HOOK
Third Party
„ Judgment Debtor

./

JEPurv

$A
V^L-

M O T I O N

Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co., Inc., the Third Party Judgment
Creditor, pursuant

to Rule 69 (k) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, moves the Court for an Order requiring the Defendant,
Irene Hook, to appear before this Court to answer questions under
oath concerning her property.

Addendum p. 32

This Motion is based upon the provisions of §77-18-1, Utah
Code Annotated, lasi
~«
*,
. J.-JJ, »s amended, and upon the pleadings and
Papers

on file

herein

which

show

that

on the 21st day of

September, 1987, a Restitution Order was made and entered herein
providing for a Judgment in favor of Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co.,
Inc., in the amount of $399,000.00 against the Defendant Irene
Hook, who was ordered to pay by way of restitution the aforesaid
sum, which judgment i n d o l e or in part is unpaid.
DATED THIS

tf

'_

d a y o f March_

„,,_

McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE &
PARKINSON, P.C.

Mi-coy A. McMurray
Attorneys for Third Party
Judgment Creditors
O R D E R
Based upon the foregoing Motion and good cause appearing
therefor;
IT

IS

HEREBY

ORDERED

that

the

Defendant

Irene

Hook

personally be and appear before the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, one
of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, at his courtroom, at
the Courts building, 240 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah
on Monday, the 4th day of April, 1988 at the hour of 2:00 o'clock
p.m., then and there to answer concerning her property.
Costs, if any, if

allowed, w i U

be assessed

at

_he

hearlng

depending on their merits.

•2-
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,,»,:>" S

STATE OF L^AH
= 5*

CONSTABLE'S RETURN

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE >
I* J* DICKSON

• beinq f i r s t duty sworn on oath depose and say*

l a m a duly appointed Deputy Constable ot the F i f t h Free i net • County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah* a c i t i z e n of the United States over the aqe of 21 years at the time ot
service herein* and not a party to or interested in the w i t h i n action*
I received the w i t h i n and hereto annexed SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
MARCH

on the 18 day ot

• 1988* and served the same UPon HOOK* IRENE

•

a w i t h i n named defendant personally known to me to be the defendant mentioned in said
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER

* by a e l i v e r i n q to and leaviiw a true copy of said SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER

for +he defendant with HOOK* IRENE

• a suitable person over the age of

14 years* RESIDING at the usual Place oi RESIDENCE of said detendant, personally
this 1? day of MARCH

• 1988* a t 6650 U* 3785 S*

•

County ot Salt Lake* State of Utah*
I further c e r t i f y that at the time ot such service of the SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
I endorsed the date and place ot service and added mv name and o f f i c i a l t i t l e thereto*
Dated t h i s 19 day of MARCH

, 1988

JOHN A, SINDT
Constable's O f f i c e * Salt Lake County

Subscribed and sworn to before *ie This 19 dav of MARCH
Hy Commission E X P i r e s i

A p r i l 1 * 1988*

r% 1988*

yj
Notary Public • ^

^ ^ B * ^ * ~ C o u n t y

of

Salt

Lake

Fee's

Service*.

3.75

Mileaflei

11.25

TOTAL: %

68865

15.00

15 DL
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*&
G$->>

DATED THIS __ (*7

day of March, 1988.
BY TEE COURT;

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

n * *
Serve Defendant a t :
I r ene

ATTEST
u ciXON HSNOLEY

Ho ok

9 \

£ ^ . 5 ^ A A A*TAI i

4^#\XlhMJ.{>L>^K~>
\
^ o«>utytti*A

6550 West 3785 South
West Valley C i t y , Utah

_3_
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1 !')"•.•* •.''.•d'C'ii District

Ilacoy A. McMurray #2214
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON
NOV 2 1989
Attorneys for Third Party Judgment Creditor
1 .-*
The Hermes Building
."" ^ .', ^ .r=^^..\-i
* ,,
455 East 500 South, Suite 300
• ^ /.. .* ^vffV'^^V
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
*--+»a**
Telephone: (801)532-5125
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

)
)

Plaintiff,
V.

]

IRENE HOOK,

;i

Defendant,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

;

HARRIS-DUDLEY PLUMBING1 COMPANY, )
a Utah corporation,
;
Third Party Judgment
Creditor,

>

Case No. CR 87-172

Judge Raymond Uno

V•

IRENE HOOK,
Third Party Judgment
Debtor.
Evidentary hearings to determine the ownership of a 24*2"
Fiberform boat trailer were held on June 14, 1988, August 5, 1988
and September 19, 1989, before the Honorable Raymond Uno, one of
the judges

of

the

above-entitled

Court,

the hearings being

incident to Robert D. Johnson's Motion to Quash on file herein.
Macoy

A.

McMurray

of

McMurray,

McMurray,

Dale

& Parkinson

appeared for and on behalf of Harris-Dudley Plumbing Company, a

Addendum p. 36

^

Utah corporation and Third Party Judgment Creditor, with Matt
Biljanic

appearing

Johnson.

for

and

on

behalf

Testimony under oath was

of Movant,

taken, exhibits

Robert

D

admitted

argument made, memoranda submitted and the Court being fully
advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1-

Irene

Hook,

received

title

to

the

subject

24•2"

Fiberform boat from Robert D. Joh nson by a Bill of Sale executed
on or about May 28, 1982.

She received title to the subject boat

trailer at or about the same time.
2.

Irene Hook subsequently registered the subject boat and

boat trailer with the Department of Motor Vehicles with the State
of Utah and at the time of the last hearing session on September
19, 1989, was still the registered owner of both the subject boat
and boat trailer.
3.
Irene Hook never reconveyed the subject boat to Robert
D. Johnson nor did shp 0 „ Q ^ ^>
xa she ever otherwise divest herself of the same.
4.
On December ^3
loa*
u
^ ,,
-J, 1986, Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co.
initiated a civil a^i--i~,,
action against Irene Hook to recover monies
embezzled by Xrene Hook from Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co. and on
January 12,

1987,

Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co. filed an Amended

Complaint seeking, among other relief, the recovery in excess of
$300,000 from Irene Hook.
5A preliminary hearing in connection with a criminal
proceeding initiated by the c. afa nf TT„ .
"7 tne „tate of Utah against Irene Hook in
the above-entitled ow™,-., ^
ed crim
^ a l matter was held on February 4, 1987.
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Irene Kook later entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced on
April 6, 1987.
6.

Robert D. Johnson claims title to both the subject boat

and the boat trailer by virtue of a purported reconveyance to him
by

Irene

Hook

on

or

about

April

27, 1987,

There was no

reconveyance of the subject boat though there was a purported
reconveyance of the boat trailer.

The purported reconveyance of

the boat trailer was without receiving a reasonable equilavent
value in exchange for the purported transfer and was with an
actual intent to hinder, delay and defraud Harris-Dudley Plumbing
Co.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes and
enters the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Irene Hook is the owner of the subject 24f2" Fiberform

boat and boat trailer.
2.

Any transfer or purported transfer of the ownership of

the boat and/or boat trailer back to Robert D. Johnson on or
about April

27, 1987, . by

Irene Hook would be

a fraudulent

conveyance within the meaning of Section 75-1-7,8 Utah Code Ann.,
1953 as amended, which Sections and related Sections have since
been repealed by Laws 1988, Chapter 59, Section 16 and replaced
by Section 25-6-1 to 13, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
3.

Robert D. Johnson's Motion to Quash should be denied.

4.

Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co. should be free to proceed

with the execution sale of the subject 24' 2" Fiberform boat and
boat trailer.

3
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DATED t h i s J^jaLay of-Gctnter,

1989.

BY THE COURT:

-J

<^W.

District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and accurrate copy of,
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law this Z-C' "
day of October, 1989, to the following:
Matt Biljanic
Attorney for Third Party Judgment Creditor
7355 South 900 East
Midvale, UT
84047

i -""j Jvo'c-t! District
M a c o y A . M c M u r r a v #2214

uny

o 1Q89

McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON
'>> ! C A T
Attorneys for Third Party Judgment Credito* ' V-\\* ^3l\£t-'i^VU
The Hermes Building
> ^ M l ^ ^ > ^
455 East 500 South, Suite 300
' 7 ""
">-i,cia*
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)532-5125
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
v.
JUDGMENT AND ORDER

IRENE HOOK,
Defendant,
HARRIS-DUDLEY PLUMBING COMPANY,
a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n ,
T h i r d P a r t y Judgment
Creditor,

Case No. CR 87-172

Judge Raymond Uno

v.

IRENE HOOK,
T h i r d P a r t y Judgment
Debtor.

Evidentary hearings to determine the ownership of a 24 2
Fiberform boat trailer were held on June 14, 1988, August 5, 1988
and September 19, 1989, before the Honorable Raymond Uno, one of
the judges

of the above-entitled

Court, the hearings

being

incident to Robert D. Johnson's Motion to Quash on file herein.
Macoy

A. McMurray

of McMurray, McMurray,

Dale

& Parkinson

appeared for and on behalf of Harris Dudley Plumbing Company, a
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Utah corporation and Third Party Judgment Creditor, with Matt
Biljanic

appearing

Johnson.

Testify

for and on behalf

of Movant,

Robert D

under oath was taken, exhibits

admitted

a r d e n t made, memoranda submitted and the Court having made and
entered and its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law herein
and being fully

a d v i s e d in che p r e m i s e s

_

NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:
1.
Irene Hook is the owner of the subject 24'2" Fiberform
boat and trailer.
2-

atm^

Any transfer or purported transfer of the ownership of

a n d / r b a t traiUr baCk
April

°27, °1987, by

Irene

R bert D J hnSOn n
"Hook
° would' be° a fraudulent
° °r

conveyance within the waning of Section 75-1-7,8 Utah Code Ann.,
1953 as amended, which Sections and related Sections have since
been repealed by Laws 1,88, Chapter 59, Section 16 and replaced
by Section 25-6-1 to 13, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.
3Robert D. Johnson's Motion to Quash is hereby denied.
*. Harris Dudley Plumbing Co. is free to proceed with the
execution sale of the subject 24 <2« Fiberform boat and boat
t r a i ller.
er.

BATED this ^

day of ^ 5 ^ 1 9 8 9 .
BY THE COURT:

~

2

District' Judge

'
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and accurrate copy
oi.^/.
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law this C-J _
day of October, 1989, to the following:
Matt Biljanic
Attorney for Third Party Judgment Creditor
7355 South 900 East
Midvale, UT
84047

*"/?<«

7
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. > ~* "~ ^

UTAH CERTIFICATE OF TITLE 3
INSTRUCTIONS
INFORMATION)
REVERSE
v>">
THIS CERTIFIES THAT THE PERSON NAMED BELOW AS OWNER HAS BEEN DULY
i\
REGISTERED IN THE OFFICE OF THE STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH AND THAT
"""€l APPLICATION FOR CERTIFICATE OF TITLE SHOWS SUCH VEHICLE TO BE SUBJECT TO THE
N LIENS ENUMERATED BELOW AND^NO OTHERS^ _ _ _ _ _ _
?

*~*yf~ (T
N

KV*£
l > '*
\)T
\
V -*£•/

OWNER"1NFORMATION""SECT1ON"

^

o
6650 W 3785 SOUTH

H00K

IRENE

VS.

jg%l£N^fJ^.vTNL ^arTTJlN^ "*7?
7 Q

/fev>

BODY TYPE

MAK^

Q l / 3[Q / J13- „

! 5 f "(3*7

FIRST

LIEN

J*_0£OMETER

HOLDER

Q

ADDRE^C
CITY STA E ZIP

SECOND

LIEN

HOLDER

r w w .C 127 RfV 2 8

1 S S ? ? S ^ ll - ^

J20554

Q /

l J ^ C 4 - » O I "

»_JI

SECTION

* ^

W-

.SECTION,,

f£N

SECTION

"EA^SI

SECOND

NAME

LIEN

k.

RELEASE

of

Ut.

SECTION

~"K

K

SIG OF LIEN HOLDER (AS SHOWN) RELEASING INTEREST

ADDRESS
CITY STATE ZIP

r7^

DATE

OWNERS

TRANSFfeK

AND

ODOMfeffck

TITLE

DlbCtOSUKt

SfcCTIOlN

V.

p.
K
rK
K

l/we the undersigned owner/s as recorded hereon hereby convey transfer and assign all rights title and inWest in *his vehicle to the new
owner as shown in Section 8 hereunder and warrant the title and the vehicle to be free and clear of any i ens or »»ncumbranv.es whatsoever
except a lien which may be in favor of the person shown as new lien holder Section 9 hereunder

V

~<\

I further certify t the best of my knowledge that the vehicle odometer reading is
reflects ihe actual mileage ot tne vehicle unless one of the following statements is checked
I

I ) The amount of mileage stated is in excess of 99 999 miles or

|

and that this reading

| 2 The odomc «?r reading is not tn* actual mileage

r

F E W R IN INKTMUST
^O
SIGNATURE
. (MUM BE
Bfc NO/ARIZED)
NUCAKIZtUI IF
If TI W
U OR
UK MORE
/vtWKC NAMES
?NA/V\C;>
APPEAR ON TITLE (EACH MUST SIGN

•A
%

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO THIS.

8^
NAME.

25s" ~A

\\

-.~^NT
AV" J
r
- A
"** 3
1\\\m J

NEW

«_-*

/

OWNERS

DAY OF

SECTION

v.

RCD LIENH0LDER [>_

FUEL

FIPST INTERSTATE BANK UT
710 S 200 WEST
______
.JSL.C
L I - -SAL 0 1 . 4— - - - ^

NAM.

Si

CYL

PREV TITLE/REG y - r -

79184
DATE ISSUED

Oy

L,(j[jK*^L

X

/

19 tA /

©

SEAL

/

**

7-

""*\

SIGNATURE OF 0>ICER ADMINISTERING OATH

NEW

NAME.

ADDRESC

ADDRESS.

CITY STATE 2 '

CITY STATE ZIP .

LIEN

HOLDER
011

K

SECTION

p.

* The Deoartment will not be responsible for false or fraudulent odometer statements made in tne assignment of the Certificate of
Title or for errors made in recording by the Department
( IMPORTANT ) THIS CERTIFICATE IS EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP FOR THE VEHICLE DESCRIBED HEREON
WHEN THIS VEHICLE IS SOLD OR TRANSFERRED, THIS INSTRUMENT, PROPERLY ENDORSED, MUST BE PRESENTED TO THE STATE TAX COMMISSION MOTOR VEHICLE
DIVISION BEFORE TRANSFER CAN BE MADE
STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT

ALTERATIONS ERASURES OR OBLITERATIONS VOID THIS CERTIFICATE

y

K
V

CHAIRMAN
^•kMHCA^'i^arMw'VMOH^V^

-p.
K

^

^

>

-

"THIS IS A LEGALLY B I N D I N G C O N T R A C T .

IF N O T U N D E R S T O O D . SfccK C O M P E T E N T ADVICE '*

EXHIBIT "1"

3tll nf §>nii>
( WIT I! WARK A S'TI F.S )

V72
ffvtutu ell iflcu li,j Zi\t*c Prtccuto:

nocErrr v. JCHUSOU

That

HwAd'f, Mali
the SELLER

to ...§?i:A?!?

$41 27

, for and in consideration of the sum oi:

in hand paid by ...
THEME V. HOOK

the BUYER

, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, hn

and transferred, and by these presents do
BUYER

bargained, sold, assent d

bargain, sell, assign and transfer unto said

that certain personal property now at

l5**j£f&

County, State of „..A£$?iL

particularly described as follows:

JJJJ.~lJJ?!k\i?™.3S.?j£.
Vdiicta

And the Seller

Uznti^lcjitLon

Mo. FOF 0522W79H24VS

upon the consideration recited above warrants ownership of and good tide

to said property, the right to sell the same and that there arc no liens, encumbrances or charges
thereon or against the same and to defend the title and possession transferred to the BUYER
against ail lawful claims.
In Witness Whereof,
JUL

day of

have hereunto set
.!•£.'

, 19..

hand
m

L(/^^

V&todiC
APPROVED FORM — UTAH SECURITIES COMMISSION

this

A F F I D A V I T

STATE OF WYOMING )
) ss.
COUNTY OF LARAMIE)

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the attached reproduction of Robert D Johnson's
1987 boat application is a true copy of records on file in the License
Section, Wyoming Game and Fish Department, 5400 Bishop Blvd., Cheyenne, WY
82002.
If the attached copies do not bear a raised seal of the Wyoming Game
and Fish Commission and the signature of the Commission Secretary, this is
not an official certified copy.

GLE/NN A. SHAFFER, CHI
'ISCAL OFFICER
/AND FISH COMMISSION
SECRETARY WYOMING G.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a notary public, Laramie County,
Wyoming on this / £ fk
day of /V) AV
1988.

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES;

U*W«* J. 6*rif* • Notoy E S T

C0UTV

" *JlK^

LARAMIE

^

p

?

STATf

°* I

WYOMING

j

My Cwwwumon Expires Doc 25, 1988 j

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY
BOAT NOJ
REG- CONTROL
/
AMOU NT PAID
! j

Mr

.rss-

J

^

P

WYOMING BOAT REGISTRATION APPLICATION
1

ANNUAL REGISTRATION FEE
REGISTRATION TRANSFER FEE
DUPLICATE REGISTRATION FEE
DEALERS AND MANUFACTURERS REGISTRATION FEENOTE:
NOTE:

NOTE:

F
\

-$5.00
-$5.00
-$1.00
-$3.00

WATERCRAFT INTRODUCED INTO WYOMING FROM OUT OF STATE DO NOT REQUIRE
TRANSFER FEE, ONLY THE ANNUAL REGISTRATION FEE OF $5.00.
PERSONS WHO PURCHASE WATERCRAFT WHICH HAVE BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE
CURRENT YEAR BY THE PREVIOUS OWNER ARE REQUIRED TO PAY ONLY THE TRANSFER
FEE OF $5.00.
PERSONS WHO PURCHASE WATERCRAFT WHICH HAVE NOT BEEN REGISTERED FOR THE
CURRENT YEAR BY THE PREVIOUS OWNER ARE REQUIRED TO PAY FOR THE ANNUAL
RENEWAL FEE OF $5.00, PLUS THE TRANSFER FEE OF $5.00, FOR A TOTAL FEE OF
$10.00.

PLEASE CIRCLE OR FILL IN THE APPROPRIATE ANSWER
1.

Applicant(s) narae(s) and address (as it will appear on registration certificate):

LAST^KAME

FIRST NAME

MIDDLE INITIAL

LAST NAME

FIRST NAME

MIDDLE INITIAL

STREET OR BOX NUMBER
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11%
12.
13.
14.

CITY

/STATE

ZIP CODE

Citizen ship of boat owner :fAy/U.S . , B. Canadian, C. Other specify
Type of application: Q!) first-time Wyo. registration B. transfer to new owner
C. renewal D. duplicate
<^~
/
Make of b o a t ^ ^ y ^ / v ^ J
length of boat: &? &2^_
color of boat: T^Ac^y
C^y^T
Use of boat: A. pleasure B. livery C. commercial D. dealer E. manufacturer
Name of previous ownery^i^/^^ /y\ r^^A^.
present # on boat, if any {J7~¥3
3&SV
Type of propulsion: A. outboard B. inboard C,Cy inboard-outdrive D. sail
Type of fuel used: (Ay ga^, B. diesel C. electric
Horsepower of engine
<2 J^O
"~ r^ffi ^yS^Jtake of engine QAJLU~
Hull material: A. p l a s t i c B . w o o d 6 . aluminum D. steel E. other
Type of construction: A. runabout B. open fishing GCL? cruiser D. houseboat
other
Manufacturers hull number: f^BFQ
S'^okJ/A
79n
Year boat was built
/9 7 9
» date of purchase
Where boat is mainly used: (j[Jl Wyoming B. Colorado C. Utah D. Nebraska

15. Wyoming lake most used:
w*lZ^Qgz^fr C^V^T7^fJ.
16. I (we) declare that I (we) own the vessel described above and that to the best of mv
(our) knowledgef^ail statenfeiits made here are correct.
SIGN

±UL

Q-/y\*Uki

DATE

S-C*?'?

MAIL APPLICATION: State/of Wyoming, Game and Fi-h Department, "ATTENTION WATERCRAFT11,
Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002
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I do hereoy cerniy that the photostat
copy is a true and correct copy of the
document on file with the State Tax
Commission
\
\ \

-"""-^m^B*

S N88

D1SPLA
r.ATE-NG
1"-^1*7**110"
<
DUPLICATE RECORD
oo7E7v HOOK IRENE D
'
STREET ADDRESS
uITV
cr - I F
o63u W 3-55 bGuTH bT
bALT LAKE CY
UT 841fcV.
7«
^"-^ -iCK'GFIL.M
3 6
FREV
RENEWAL-DATE
TYPE
TITLE-'NO TYPE T D A T F ^ ^ ' J
^70
REGISTRAR
5S 7
VEHICLE
... °DESCRIPTION
V
1352SS6 'INL'ZJUBS
,UiSa^
^
»
^
T
P-SSAFETY
51
YR
FLATE-N
dU&
°
UT
S7
- H i U S rrt W A K E STYLE
M O D E L ^ Y R rYi • T - •VIN-3T-FLG BB7E7
LL WLLC
-CM
I? C V L * T r u E L DI5FL NADA-KEY-rR
TRAN
LESSEE INFORMATION:
71iak
" '
ln%
NAME -._
^ ,..-_„
9 A85526
ADDRE5
LIEN HOLDER INFORMATION^
5
CITY
ST "IP

NAME
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK UT
COMMENTS AREA.

c_v„
^"."VSn*u-?™!5
l u a
^ ^ ^ » * T

5
5riLT

L

CITY — - ST ZIP
^ ^
A | ~ c y
UT
OP-ID EXAM-C
91

6 6131

:iATT BILJANIC A0323
Accornev for involuntary
Defendant
7355 South 9th .East
Midvale, Utah 84047
Phone: 255-3576
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

.
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT D. JOHNSON

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

IRENE HOOK,

.
Defendant.

Civil No. CR 87 172

HARRIS DUDLEY PLUMBING CO., INC.
a Utah corporation,

:

Judge Raymond S. Uno

Third Party
Judgment Creditor,
vs.

:

IRENE HOOK.

:

Third Party,
Judgment Debtor.
S'lATE OF UTAH

:

)
: SS

Countv of Salt Lake )
Comes now Robert D. Johnson and upon his oath deposes
is fc:.ows•
!.

I state

rhe

f a l l o w i n g upon mv own i n f o r m a t i o n

arui
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2.

That on or about February 26 and 27, 1979 I

acquired a boat, a copy of rh* H . I U .
co
Py or the title being .attached hereto as
exhibit A. Further ^,,« „u ,
urther, two checks are attached hereto as exhibit
B&C which shows payment hv = **.? .. *
v ymenc by affiant for the boat to Petersen
Marine.
3. That Irene Hook was to acquire a two-thirds interest
in the boat but failed f* «, i
railed to make payment of the monies owed to
affiant and therefore hay ,•„«.
rerore her interest was transferred back to this
affiant April 27 1987
TU c*.
, i*a/. That affiant paid a debt of $6 000
owed by Irene Hook to her parents and that amount, together with
^.466.22 was the amount owed by Irene Hook to this affiant.

The

transfer in April, 1987 occurred because of her non-payment.
4

'

That

affiar

>c is the owner of the boat which is

che subject of a sale scheduled on April 5, 1988 at 11.-45 A.M.
That the Defendant ha<? ai«„i .. ,
naS
absolutely no interest in the boat.
DATED this
l / ^
A
J4'
//
,iS
=>V
day of /fftt-lC^L, 1988

JZLJ)M
ROBERT D. JOHNSON
^

of

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J " ^ ~

"T^tcl-cV^

dav

, i9 8 8 %
i.

J<nt r/.f /L.

My Commission Expires

/ /

f

jtlb-^.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:

Uv//4-

/

< •J-£

Ss

' *

/ ^ /

/

AHdpnrhim n

A.Q

RllRiOiT^^JFrFIILEc

• .v
•:.:. Si
>tmrz.
<«+

.j

.

-HOOK - M E N Y - V ^
' 665/3 JU 'J 17BS" ISQXitk'^ £

^.T.^r.

• • • 41 -

. i 4fc4 -

« * • 4 4 »

• » ' «

- - - 1 •* «•* r

M * P t 4-*•••*' Jim a*

\.y i
I "i r
V4 Vi

i
|
4**44- »*•**
*_ i T
toV A*'? t»^<i*»"fti»
O^toi^C***i :*••••-- *•»**•
! itie
* *s£,,1l»>
-'t-^v^rrir
»'*»»*^*5«
inftf<i.<vi»yo.f
'»**•:
k nut.** S.'i^Qfdl.rv

: * • • « * : •••»••
•.
C W^CTANfYTHIS' C?J?TJflp^Jp; tf fVlDfNOLQf OWNE*3>ftP *OK IHfc VEHlCX*, DESCKftED HE KtON
- - - --WHEN 4HIS^VENlClE IS SOLD- 0 8 - JRAMSFBRRliO -THIS" JNSTRUMfcNl, PKOPOUr EM-

r *

*
(

t
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R

- D. JOHNSON

1215

P. O. BOX 7326
™ 0 KlVCRSlOf DRIVF
MUkKAY, UTAH
04107
4

jl PJV to the
5 I order or

1 _ . - . / 19.V.

/
s ' •'

$. _

V *LJBU

WalkerBank-

-Dollars

I

" O N « M o*»«t
UIWUTtMMUTH.lM.T
" « « V . UTAH 14101

./O
C7-

£»•

R

i ai s

Uz-?Ui4&.
/oaaiU6qflB7/

- D. JOHNSON
P. O. BOX 7326

WO

Pay to the
• order nt

h

r\

RIVCRSIDE DRIVE

"«•«*», UTAH
/?,-. .
/—U- •

a w

l

7. WalkerBank ' n F • v

.JJUJTCOMp^
AMD TRUST C O M * * —
» « W t00 tOUTH.
• ° ^ H - « A £y*'*°"«*
L 7 ^ ^ UTAH 04101

tt

_4
UE,

x

0000050000.

A H H c m r k i m -r%

CI

MAY 5

HSBa

me

»*IW«IAW;HUS?ECW1.!ST

I d-. haJty opraty \i\at .-he psiou*!*
r*py is 4 urea sad eurrsct a>pv n; ...-

dceunwraft a i ftU ^ati vn- Suur '<•
— J — £ -

• H

* o 9

-VRfi
REC. VEH. REGISTRATION DISPLAY
PLATE-NO
OWNER
STREET ADDRESS
BT079151 HOOK IRENE D
6650 U 3785 SOUTH ST
CITY
ST ZIP
CO DIST VALUE MICROFILM
HULL F
SALT LAKE CY
UT 84120
18 029 12000 68616979473
PRE1.' REGISTRATION
RENEUAL-DATE TYPE TITLE-NO TYPE _T-DATE PAYMENT P -SAFETY
ST YR PLATE-NO
04 87
_. "
~~^,
UT S7 BT0791M
cHICLE DESCRIPTION: -HIN FBF05221M79H Z1
ASGND* UT4336ST
VIN-ST-ELG
STATUS TYPE MAKE S-TY-L-E
MOflBt" YR CYL UT FUEL DISPL LENGTH
TRAN-D
L
BB FBF
10
79
24 02
071186
iSSEZ. INFORMATION:
HAflE
STREET AUUKESS
CITi
SrJ ZIP
IEN HOLDER INFORMATION:
NAME
STREET ADDRESS
CITI
ST ZIP
N/A
0 0000
COMMENTS AREA:
FILE-CD DOC-DATE
R
04 30 SL-

OP-ID

OR

EXAfl-OFI

6666
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&X

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
1095 Motor Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116

H

May 5 ,

Clyde R. Nichols, Jr.
Executive Director

1988
R. H. Hansen, Chairman
Roger O. Tew, Commissioner
Joe B. Pacheco, Commissioner
G. Blaine Davis, Commissioner

MAKE:
YEAR:
MODEL :
VIN :

WLLC
1979
791
79184

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
The records of the Department of Motor Vehicles, State
of Utah, reflect the following information to be correct:
Name of Owner: Irene D. Hook
Address:
6650 West 3785 South, Salt Lake City, UT 84120
Make:
WLLC
Year:
1979
Model: 791
Body:
BT
VIN:
79184
Lien Holder: First Interstate Bank UT
Utah Title Number: 1552256
Please accept this letter as Certification of the
information on file with the State of Utah.
If we can be of further assistance, please contact this
Division.
Respectfully,

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
Motor Vehicle Division

kdb
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MAY 3 1 1 9 8

MATT BILJANIC A032J
Attorney for i n v o l u n t a r y
Defendant
7355 South 9th East
Midvale, Utah 84047
Phone: 255-3576
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
AFFIDAVIT OF IRENE HOOK

Plaintiff,
vs .

Civil No. CR 87 172

IRENE HOOK,
Defendant

Judge Raymond S. Uno

ilARRIS DUDLEY PLUMBING CO., INC
,i I'tah c o r p o r a t i o n ,
Third Party
Judgment C r e d i t o r ,
vs .
IRENE HOOK,

Third Party,
Judgment Debtor

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake )

ss

Irene hook, by wnv of a Counter-Affidavit to che Affidavit
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of John R. Dudley, being first duly sworn upon oath deposes and
says as follows:
1.

That affiant is the Defendant named in the above

entitled matter.
2.

That on or about the 6th day of May, 1987, I

signed a Wyoming boat registration application, item 6, with
Che intention of transfering any interest 1 had in the boat
described in that document to R.D. Johnson.

I made the transfer

to-1 R.D. Johnson because 1 owed him $5,000 which represented a
baLance I owed him for acquiring the boat.

Further, I owed

R.D. Johnson the sum of $6,000 which I loaned to my parentsby
cashier's check written on the centennial branch of the Walker
Bank located at 1991 South 3600 West, Salt Lake City, Utah 34104.
Further, I owed R.D. Johnson $3,060.00 for payments he made on
my Blazer automobile and $406.22 that he made for insurance
payments on said vehicle.

That at the time I made the transfer

o\' Lhc boat and trailer to R D. Johnson'T had borrowed $10,200.00
on my home to pay the restitution order by the court.

The

transfer was made for a legitimate debt and not for purposes of
defrauding anyone.
3.

That

John R. Dudley personally was aware

of the fact that 1 owed R.D. Johnson $5,000.00.

That on numerous
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occasions he talked to me personally about the fact that R.D.
Johnson sold the boat to me but that I had not paid him.
R.D. Johnson called my place of employement

-

That

Harris-Dudley

Plumbing, Co. Inc. at least twice a month for a period of 5 years
demanding payment of the monies I owed him or title to the boat
and trailer.
4.

That affiant denies the statements made by John R.

Dudley in paragraph 2 of his affidavit,and attached hereto an
affidavit signed by Glenn A. Shaffer, Chief Fiscal Officer Secretary, Wyoming Game and Fish Commission dated May 12, 1988,
together with a copy of the Wyoming boat registration application
showing ownership of the boat being in the name of R.D. Johnson.
5.

Affiant denies paragraph 3 of John R. Dudley's

affidavit because Dudley and his employees kiew that R.D. Johnson
retained an interest in the boat because of facts set forth
in paragraph 2 of this Affidavit.
6.

Affiant denies paragraph 5 of John R. Dudley's

affidavit and incorporates herein the information contained on
che attached documents.
7.

Affiant denies paragraph 6 of John R. Dudley's

affidavit and states chat che trailer was transferred April 27,
LQ37 and the boat was transferred May b, 1937, as evidenced by
attached documents.
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8-

Affianc denies che allegations concained in

paragraph 7, 8 and 9 and incorporates by reference herein che
information concained in che accached documents.
9-

That John R. Dudley had personal knowledge of all

faces set forth in this affidavic as did che following named
individuals:
Mayfield.

Ken Tingey, Tim Black, Ron Larsen, and Tex

Also, Sceven Hook,Russell Hook, and Sharon Smich knew

of che foregoing farrc a„,j -ii
5
§
races and will cescify chereco.
10. This affiant did noc prepare a formal Bill of Sale
based upon the fart- t-k-n- • *.
tnat it was not required under Wyoming law,
as the law required that would not become effective uncil
May 22, 1987.

See che letter dated December, 1937 signed by

John Rinehard of the Wyoming Game and Fish Department, a copy
of which is attached hereto and by reference incorporated herein
Thac che documencs were execuccd ac an office in Green River and
affianc was advised accordingly.
Thac ac che presenc cime affianc has absolucely no
interest in the boar **A cno boat: and craUer which has been executed upon
by Karris-Dudley PLumbins. Co.

a n d h a s h a dn o l n c e r e s c

M « 6. 1987 on ch. bene and A p r i l

BATED Chis _U\ay

of

2 7 .1 M 7Q n th,

slnce

erallQr

yfa^
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
7//'/-'-

<*/. *"-' day of

-1983

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:

-//

Residing at:

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Affidavit of Irene Hook to Macoy A. McMurray,
Attorneys for Plaintiff, The Hermes Building, 455 East Fifth South,
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 34111, postage prepaid, this
__27__

day of

/rt*l<*r

,1988.

MATT BlLJAN'lC

~Z7
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